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Abstract
In a “common values” environment, some market participants have private information
relevant to others’ assessments of their own valuations or costs. Economic theory shows
that this type of informational asymmetry can have important implications for market
performance and market design. Yet even for the classic example of an oil lease auction,
formal evidence on the presence and strength of common values has been limited by
the problem of auction-level unobserved heterogeneity that is likely to affect both participation in an auction and bidders’ willingness to pay. Here we develop an empirical
approach for first-price sealed bid auctions with affiliated values, unobserved heterogeneity, and endogenous bidder entry. We show that important features of the model
are nonparametrically identified and apply a semiparametric estimation approach to
data from U.S. offshore oil and gas lease auctions. Our empirical results show that
common values, affiliated private information, and unobserved heterogeneity—three
distinct phenomena with different implications for policy and empirical work—are all
present. Failing to account for unobserved heterogeneity obscures the empirical evidence of common values. We examine the implications of our estimates for the classic
revenue ranking of sealed bid auction designs, and for the interaction between affiliation, the winner’s curse, and the number of bidders in determining the aggressiveness
of bidding and seller revenue.
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Introduction

In many auction settings it seems likely that important information commonly known
among bidders is unobserved by the econometrician. Ignoring such unobserved heterogeneity can lead to a variety of errors. One may infer too much within-auction
correlation in bidders’ private information, as well as too much cross-auction variation in this information, leading to incorrect conclusions about such issues as bidder
market power, the division of surplus, and optimal auction design.1 In a first-price
auction, unobserved heterogeneity presents a particular challenge because standard
identification approaches exploit the insight that bidders’ equilibrium beliefs about
the competition can be inferred from observed distributions of bids;2 with unobserved
auction-level heterogeneity, bidders’ beliefs condition on information unavailable to
the econometrician. A further problem is that auction-level unobservables are likely
to affect not only bids but also bidder participation. Such endogenous bidder entry
threatens several identification and testing approaches relying on exogenous variation
in the level of competition.3
Here we propose an empirical approach for first-price sealed bid auctions with
affiliated values, unobserved heterogeneity, and endogenous bidder entry. We show
nonparametric identification of key structural features and propose a semiparametric
estimation approach. We apply the approach to auctions of offshore oil and gas leases
in the United States Outer Continental Shelf (“OCS”) in order to evaluate important
features of these auctions, including the presence of common values.
Although the term “common values” (or “interdependent values”) is often asso1

See, e.g., Krasnokutskaya (2011), Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2011), Athey, Levin, and Seira
(2011), and Roberts (2013).
2

See, e.g., Laffont and Vuong (1993), Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000), Li, Perrigne, and
Vuong (2002), Hendricks, Pinkse, and Porter (2003), and Athey and Haile (2006, 2007).
3
See, e.g., Gilley and Karels (1981), Athey and Haile (2002), Haile, Hong, and Shum (2003),
Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2009), Campo, Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2011), and Gillen (2010).
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ciated with auctions, it refers to a classic form of adverse selection that can arise in
a broad range of environments where some parties to a potential transaction have
private information relevant to others’ assessments of their own valuations or costs
(e.g., Akerlof (1970), Arrow (1970), Vincent (1989), Maskin and Tirole (1992), and
Deneckere and Liang (2006)). Testing hypotheses about the nature of private information necessarily relies on an indirect approach, and auctions often offer settings in
which the maintained assumptions relied upon can be tightly linked to actual market
institutions.
But while an auction of drilling rights is frequently cited as an example of a common values environment, formal testing for common values has been hindered by
the confounding effects of unobserved heterogeneity. Indeed, we reject private values
in favor of common values only when accounting for unobserved heterogeneity and
endogenous bidder entry. More broadly, we find that affiliated private information,
common values, and common knowledge unobservables—three distinct phenomena
with different implications for policy and empirical work4 —are all present in OCS
auctions. We also use our results to quantify Milgrom and Weber’s (1982) classic
revenue ranking of first- and second-price sealed bid auctions, and to examine the
interaction between affiliation, the winner’s curse, and the number of bidders in determining the aggressiveness of bidding and seller revenue.
Prior work on testing for common values in auctions includes Paarsch (1992),
Athey and Haile (2002), Bajari and Hortaçsu (2003), Haile, Hong, and Shum (2003),
Hill and Shneyerov (2014), and Hortaçsu and Kastl (2012). Most of this work, like
ours, exploits the fact that in a common values auction the winner’s curse becomes
more severe as the number of competitors grows (all else equal). Our testing approach
4

For example, affiliation leads to the “linkage principle” (Milgrom and Weber (1982), Milgrom
(1987)) whereas common values leads to the “winner’s curse,” each with potentially important
implications for auction design. Unobserved heterogeneity, which is held fixed in auction theory,
implies neither affiliation nor common values but creates challenges for identification.
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is most similar to that in Haile, Hong, and Shum (2003) (“HHS”), discussed further
below, who studied timber auctions. Our generalizations of their model relax their
most restrictive assumptions but make identification substantially more challenging
and require a different estimation approach.
Our empirical study of OCS auctions is related to that of Hendricks, Pinkse,
and Porter (2003) (“HPP”), who focused on testable implications of a pure common
values model.5 Our work is complementary to theirs. We allow the pure common
values model but do not assume it, and we neither exploit nor rely on estimates
of realized tract values. HPP point out that tests for common values would be
difficult to apply due to likely correlation between bidder entry and auction-level
unobservables. Our study also complements Haile, Hendricks, and Porter (2010)
and the simultaneous work of Aradillas-Lopez, Haile, Hendricks, and Porter (2019),
which focus on implications of competitive (vs. collusive) bidding in OCS auctions
after the introduction of “area-wide leasing” in 1983. Here we consider only the period
1954–1983, where the evidence in Haile, Hendricks, and Porter (2010) supports the
assumption of competitive bidding, and we focus on methodological and substantive
issues driven by the nature of bidders’ information—both shared and private.
Haile and Kitamura (2019) review existing econometric approaches to first-price
auctions with unobserved heterogeneity. All require compromises of some form. Several (e.g., Krasnokutskaya (2011), Hu, McAdams, and Shum (2013), D’Haultfoeuille
and Fevrier (2015)) require that bidders have independent types, enabling all correlation among bids to be attributed to unobserved heterogeneity.6 Krasnokutskaya and
Seim (2011) and Gentry and Li (2014) have extended these methods to models with
5

Earlier work on OCS auctions includes Gilley and Karels (1981), Hendricks, Porter, and
Boudreau (1987), Hendricks and Porter (1988), and Hendricks, Porter, and Spady (1989), as well as
Li, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000), who called for formal testing for common values.
6

See also the partial identification results in Armstrong (2013). An exception among approaches
building on the measurement error literature is Balat (2017). His extension of Hu, McAdams, and
Shum (2013) exploits observation of potential bidders’ entry decisions at two sequential stages.
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endogenous entry. Other approaches to unobserved heterogeneity use a control function strategy requiring a one-to-one mapping between the unobserved heterogeneity
and an observed auxiliary outcome (often, the number of bidders), allowing one to
indirectly condition on the unobservable (e.g., Campo, Perrigne, and Vuong (2003),
HHS, Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2009), Roberts (2013)). Simultaneous work by
Kitamura and Laage (2018) proposes a finite mixture approach allowing affiliated
types but requiring that the unobservable be discrete (cf. HHS and Hu, McAdams,
and Shum (2013)) and enter through a separable structure similar to that in Krasnokutskaya (2011). Finally, while control function approaches can provide a strategy
for isolating exogenous variation in bidder entry, others generally do not.
Our approach requires compromises as well. We rely on an index assumption
similar to that in Krasnokutskaya (2011) and Kitamura and Laage (2018). Like
HHS, we require an instrument for entry and rely on a reduced form for the entry
outcome in which the auction unobservable is the only latent factor. This rules out
selective entry, for example. And our use of a reduced form implies that additional
structure would be needed to evaluate interventions that would alter the map from
auction characteristics to entry outcomes (see, e.g., section 8.1.).
But our approach also offers advantages. It avoids the requirement of independent
bidder types and provides a strategy for exploiting exogenous sources of variation in
bidder entry. This combination of features is particularly important in our application. Common values settings generally demand that we allow correlated types (signals), and our test for common values relies on exogenous variation in entry arising
through an instrument. We also avoid requiring a bijection (conditional on covariates) between entry and the unobservable (cf. Campo, Perrigne, and Vuong (2003),
HHS, and Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2009))—a requirement that can be difficult
to rationalize and which limits the support of the unobservable. In contrast, we show
that our empirical model can be derived from a two-stage game motivated by our
4

application—an entry stage à la Berry (1992) in which bidders choose whether to acquire a signal of the good’s value, followed by competitive bidding à la Milgrom and
Weber (1982). In this example, the underlying unobserved heterogeneity may have
arbitrary dimension and unrestricted support, may be correlated with observables,
may exhibit spatial dependence, and may affect sample selection.
The following section describes our model. In Section 3 we address nonparametric
identification. Section 4 describes our proposed estimation method. We then narrow
our focus to the OCS auctions, with model estimates discussed in section 5. We
examine the tests for common values in section 6, then explore revenue implications
of our estimates in section 7. We discuss several caveats, extensions, and directions
for future work in section 8 before concluding in section 9.

2

Model

We consider a standard model of first-price sealed bid auctions with symmetric affiliated values, extended to allow for auction-level heterogeneity and endogenous bidder
entry. Each auction t is associated with observed characteristics Xt ∈ X and a scalar
unobservable Ut . Without further loss, we let Ut be uniformly distributed on [0, 1].

Assumption 1. Xt

|=

We also assume independence between Xt and Ut .
Ut .

The restriction to a scalar unobservable independent of Xt is less restrictive than
it may appear. We show below that this representation can be derived—without loss
of generality for most purposes motivating estimation of an auction model—from a
model in which auction-level unobservables have arbitrary dimension and arbitrary
dependence with Xt . In that model, the weak monotonicity conditions required below
are also obtained as results rather than assumptions.

5

For each auction t we postulate a two-stage process in which entry is followed by
bidding. We do not specify a particular model of entry; rather, we posit a reduced
form for the entry outcome and assume Bayes Nash equilibrium in the auction stage.
The number of bidders entering auction t is denoted by Nt . Bidders are assumed
risk neutral. Bidder i’s valuation for the good offered is denoted by Vit . Upon
entering, i observes a private signal Sit ∈ [s, s] of Vit . Let Vt = (V1t , . . . , VNt t ),
St = (S1t , . . . , SNt t ), and S−it = St \Sit .
The bidding stage follows Milgrom and Weber (1982). The realizations of (Nt , Xt , Ut )
are common knowledge among bidders, as is the distribution of (St , Vt ) | (Nt , Xt , Ut ).7
In addition, each bidder i knows the signal Sit . Let FSV (St , Vt |Nt , Xt , Ut ) denote the
joint distribution of signals and valuations conditional on (Nt , Xt , Ut ). We make the
following standard assumptions on this conditional distribution.
Assumption 2. (i) For all n ∈ suppNt | (Xt , Ut ), FSV (St , Vt |n, Xt , Ut ) has a continuously differentiable joint density that is affiliated, exchangeable in the indices
i = 1, . . . , n, and positive on (s, s)n × (v, v)n ; (ii) E[Vit |Sit , S−it , Nt , Xt , Ut ] exists and
is strictly increasing in Sit .
Because the bidding stage involves a standard affiliated values model, it nests
a variety of special cases. With private values, E[Vit |Sit , S−it , Nt , Xt , Ut ] does not
depend on S−it . In our setting this is equivalent to bidders’ knowing their valuations,
i.e., Sit = Vit . When E[Vit |Sit , S−it , Nt , Xt , Ut ] depends on S−it , we have common
7

Although standard, the assumption that bidders observe the number of competitors may be
inappropriate in some applications. In our model of entry outcomes below, Nt is completely determined by the common knowledge auction characteristics Xt , Zt , Ut . And in our data, we reject
the hypothesis that bidders are unaware of the realized nt in favor of bidding strategies that are
more aggressive (given Xt , Ut ) for larger nt (see section 7.1). HPP point out that in OCS auctions,
rivals’ joint bidding agreements and participation in follow-up seismic surveys are typically known,
and that bidders performing a follow-up survey submit bids on roughly 80% of the tracts analyzed.
Nonetheless, these empirical findings and institutional features leave room for the possibility that
bidders have some uncertainty about the level of competition faced. In general, one challenge in
relaxing the assumption that nt is observed is the need to specify precisely the information available
to bidders when forming expectations of the competition. See, e.g., HPP and Gentry and Li (2014).
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values (or interdependent values). A special case of the common values model is that
of pure common values, where Vit = V̄t for all i.
A conditional expectation of particular relevance for what follows is




w(sit ; nt , xt , ut ) ≡ E Vit Sit = max Sjt = sit , Nt = nt , Xt = xt , Ut = ut .
j6=i

This is a bidder’s expected value of winning the auction conditional on all common
knowledge information, the observed private signal, and the event (typically counterfactual) that this signal ties for the highest among all bidders at the auction. This
expectation plays an important role in the theory because, when equilibrium bidding
strategies turn out to be strictly increasing in signals, tying for the highest signal
means that even arbitrarily small deviations from one’s equilibrium bid will change
the identity of the winner. We therefore refer to w(sit ; nt , xt , ut ) as bidder i’s “pivotal
expected value” at auction t. Pivotal expected values also play a central role in our
strategy for discriminating between private values and common values.
We impose the following restriction on how the auction characteristics (Xt , Ut )
affect bidder valuations.
Assumption 3. (i) Vit = Γ (Xt , Ut ) Vit0 ; (ii) conditional on Nt , (V1t0 , . . . , VN0t t , S1t , . . . , SNt t )
is independent of (Xt , Ut ); (iii) Γ(Xt , Ut ) is strictly positive for all (Xt , Ut ), bounded,
and weakly increasing in Ut .
Assumption 3 is an index restriction requiring multiplicative separability in (Xt , Ut )
and weak monotonicity in Ut .8 An assumption of multiplicative (or additive) separability has often been relied upon in the auctions literature, including for identification
in other settings with unobserved heterogeneity. Our identification result will rely on
8

Without a distributional restriction like that in part (ii) of the assumption, part (i) would have
no content. And because more “desirable” realizations of the unobservable state can be labeled with
larger values, the monotonicity restriction in (iii) only rules out variation with Xt in the partial
order on the unobservable implied by desirability (see also Example 1 and Appendix A).
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this assumption as well.9 Without further loss, we normalize the scale of Γ relative
to that of Vit0 by taking an arbitrary point x0 ∈ X and setting

Γ x0 , 0 = 1.

(1)

We assume initially that the auction is conducted without a binding reserve
price, although below we consider an extension allowing a random reserve price.
Under Assumption 2, the auction stage of our model admits a unique Bayesian Nash
equilibrium in weakly increasing strategies; these strategies, which we denote by
β(·; Xt , Ut , Nt ) : [s, s] → R, are symmetric and strictly increasing.10 Let the random
variable Bit = β (Sit ; Xt , Ut , Nt ) denote the equilibrium bid of bidder i in auction t,
with Bt denoting (B1t , . . . , BNt t ).
A useful fact is that the separability required by Assumption 3 is inherited by the
equilibrium bidding strategies.11 Thus, under Assumptions 2 and 3 we may write
β (Sit ; Xt , Ut , Nt ) = Γ (Xt , Ut ) β 0 (Sit ; Nt ) ,

(2)

where β 0 denotes the symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium bidding strategy for an
Nt -bidder auction at which Γ (Xt , Ut ) = Γ (x0 , 0) = 1. Following HHS, we refer to
Bit0 = β 0 (Sit ; Nt ) and Vit0 as “homogenized” bids and valuations.
We link the model of a single auction to the observed sample through Assumption
4. Given Assumption 3, this is the standard assumption that auctions are i.i.d.
9

For for what follows it is sufficient that the conditional expectations E[Vit |St , Xt , Ut , Nt ] take
the multiplicatively separable form. This weaker condition will be more natural when these ex ante
conditional expectations are positive even though Vit may take negative values.
10

See Theorem 2.1 in Athey and Haile (2007) and the associated references. Milgrom and Weber
(1982) characterize the equilibrium strategies.
11

See, e.g., HHS, Athey and Haile (2007), or Krasnokutskaya (2011).

8

conditional on auction characteristics, (Nt , Xt , Ut ). However, we do not require Ut to

Assumption 4. (Vt0 , St )

|=

be independent across auctions.
(Vt00 , St0 ) for t0 6= t.

Finally, we specify the outcome of the entry stage by supposing that the number
of bidders at auction t satisfies

Nt = η (Xt , Zt , Ut )

(3)

for some function η that is weakly increasing in Ut . Formally, (3) is an assumed
reduced form for the entry outcome. The weak monotonicity requirement links the
interpretation of the unobservable in the entry and bidding stages: unobservables that
make the good for sale more valuable also encourage more entry. The new variable
Zt in (3) is an exogenous auction-specific observable that affects bidder entry but is

Ut |Xt ; (ii) Zt

|=

Assumption 5. (i) Zt

|=

otherwise excludable from the auction model, as formalized in Assumption 5.
(St , Vt0 )|Nt .

The following example, discussed more fully in Appendix A, describes one fully
specified two-stage game leading to the structure assumed above.
Example 1. Consider a model of entry and bidding for an OCS oil and gas lease,
where a standard simultaneous move entry stage à la Berry (1992) precedes a competitive bidding stage à la Milgrom and Weber (1982). Players in the game are firms in
the industry. The tract offered for lease is associated with observables Xt , which includes (among other relevant covariates) the number of active leases on neighbor tracts
and the sets of bidders for those leases.12 The active neighbor leases are owned by Zt
distinct neighbor firms. Tract-level unobservables are denoted by Et . Et may have
12

Tracts s and t are defined to be neighbors if their boundaries coincide at some point.
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arbitrary dimension, may be correlated with Xt , and may be spatially correlated. The
characteristics Xt and Et are assumed to scale valuations (multiplicatively) through a
bounded index λ (Xt , Et ). Firms play a two-stage game. They first choose simultaneously whether to enter, with each entering firm i incurring a signal acquisition cost
ci (Xt ). Signal acquisition costs are common knowledge and lower for neighbor firms
than other (non-neighbor) firms.13 Entrants learn their private signals and the number
of entrants, then participate in a first-price sealed bid auction with symmetric affiliated values. Appendix A shows that all pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilibria (with
weakly increasing strategies in the bidding stage) can be represented by the model and
assumptions above. This representation is obtained by defining Ut = Fλ (λ(xt , Et )|xt ),
where Fλ (·|x) is the CDF of the random variable λ(x, Et ). Observe that in this case
the distribution of Ut does not vary with Xt , although its interpretation does.14

3

Nonparametric Identification

In this section we develop sufficient conditions for identification of the entry model,
the index function Γ, and key features of the bidding model. We address each of
these in turn. Throughout we assume that the observables include Xt , Zt , Nt and
Bt .15 Let Y denote the support of (Xt , Zt ), and let Y (n) denote that conditional on
Nt = n. Let n ≥ 0 denote the minimum value in the support of Nt ; let n denote the
maximum.

Recalling (1), for convenience we take x0 such that for some z we have

(x0 , z) ∈ Y (n).
13

This structure generalizes that in Hendricks and Porter (1988), where neighbors obtain a private
signal for free but non-neighbors face an infinite cost of signal acquisition.
14

In that case, knowledge of the function Γ will not be sufficient to characterize the effects of a
ceteris paribus change in Xt on bidder valuations. See the additional discussion in Appendix A.
15

In some applications, data may be available only for auctions attracting at least one bidder. In
Appendix A we show that, within the fully specified model of Example 1, our maintained assumptions
and analysis remain valid in the presence of such sample selection. Our examination of the OCS
auction data will exploit this result.
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3.1

Identification of the Entry Model

We show identification of the entry model under the following regularity condition on
the support of Nt |(Xt , Zt ).
Assumption 6. For all (x, z) ∈ Y, there exist n (x, z) and n (x, z) such that η (x, z, Ut )
has support (n (x, z) , n (x, z) + 1, . . . , n (x, z)) .
Given Assumption 6, for any (x, z) ∈ Y, the function η (x, z, ·) is characterized by
thresholds
τn(x,z)−1 (x, z) ≤ τn(x,z) (x, z) ≤ ... ≤ τn(x,z) ,
where
τn(x,z)−1 (x, z) ≡ 0,

τn(x,z) (x, z) ≡ 1,

(4)

and for n = {n (x, z) , . . . , n (x, z)},

τn−1 (x, z) = inf {u ∈ [0, 1] : η (x, z, u) ≥ n} .

With this observation, identification of η follows easily.
Theorem 1. Under Assumptions 1–6, η is identified.
Proof. For each (x, z), n (x, z) and n (x, z) equal min{Nt |Xt = x, Zt = z} and
max{Nt |Xt = x, Zt = z}, respectively. For n = n (x, z) , . . . , n (x, z), τn (x, z) =
Pr (Nt ≤ n|Xt = x, Zt = z) . With (4), this implies the result.



Identification of η determines the effects of Zt on bidder entry and provides bounds
τnt −1 (xt , zt ) and τnt (xt , zt ) on the realization of each unobservable Ut . As shown in
the following corollary (proved in Appendix B), it also determines the distribution of
Ut conditional on (Xt , Nt ).
Corollary 1. Under Assumptions 1–6, the distribution of Ut |(Xt , Nt ) is identified.
11

3.2

Identification of the Index Function

Define
γ (x, u) = ln Γ (x, u) .
We first provide conditions sufficient to identify γ (x, u) at each x ∈ X and u ∈ Ux ,
where
[

Ux =

{τn−1 (x, z), τn (x, z)} .

z:(x,z)∈Y
n∈supp η(x,z,Ut )

We then give additional conditions guaranteeing that Ux = [0, 1] for each x. We begin
with the following result, whose proof illustrates a key argument.
Lemma 1. Under Assumptions 1–6, for all n ≥ n, all (x, z) ∈ Y (n), and all (x0 , z 0 ) ∈
Y (n), the differences γ (x0 , τn (x0 , z 0 ))−γ (x, τn (x, z)) and γ (x0 , τn−1 (x0 , z 0 ))−γ (x, τn−1 (x, z))
are identified.
Proof. By (2) and monotonicity of the equilibrium bid function,
inf {ln Bit | Nt = n, Xt = x, Zt = z} = γ (x, τn−1 (x, z)) + ln β 0 (s; n) .
So under Assumptions 1–6, for any n and all (x, z) and (x0 , z 0 ) in Y (n), the differences
γ (x0 , τn−1 (x0 , z 0 )) − γ (x, τn−1 (x, z))

(5)

are identified.16 Similarly, since
sup {ln Bit | Nt = n, Xt = x, Zt = z} = γ (x, τn (x, z)) + ln β 0 (s; n) ,
16

Because β 0 (s; n) = E[Vit0 |Sjt = s, j = 1, . . . , n] and β 0 (s; n) ≤ E[Vit0 |Sjt = s, j = 1, . . . , n] for all
s (see, e.g., Milgrom and Weber (1982)), both β 0 (s; n) and β 0 (s; n) are finite under Assumption 2.

12

we obtain identification of the differences
γ (x0 , τn (x0 , z 0 )) − γ (x, τn (x, z))
for all n and all (x, z) and (x0 , z 0 ) in Y (n).

(6)



Thus far we have not imposed any requirement on the support of Zt or its effect
on entry outcomes. Below we will do so in order to obtain point identification of γ.
However, even in the case that no instrument is available, Theorem 1, Corollary 1, and
Lemma 1 still hold. And once γ is known, Zt plays no further role in our identification
results. Thus, while we rely on an instrument to obtain point identification, this
reliance is formally limited to ensuring that we can move from the partial identification
of γ provided by Lemma 1 to point identification of γ.
As a step toward point identification, we introduce two additional assumptions.
These allow us to show that the first differences obtained above can be differenced
again, cancelling common terms, to obtain a set of first differences sufficient to pin
down the value of the index γ(x, u) at all x and u ∈ Ux .
Assumption 7. For all n ∈ {n + 1, n + 2, . . . , n}, Y (n − 1) ∩ Y (n) is nonempty.
Assumption 8. There exists n∗ such that
(i) ∀n ∈ {n, . . . , n∗ }, Y contains points (x (n) , z (n)) and (x (n) , ẑ (n)) such that
n (x (n) , z (n)) = n and n (x (n) , ẑ (n)) = n + 1; and
(ii) ∀n ∈ {n∗ , . . . , n}, Y contains points (x0 (n) , z 0 (n)) and (x0 (n) , ẑ 0 (n)) such that
n (x0 (n) , z 0 (n)) = n and n (x0 (n) , ẑ 0 (n)) = n − 1.
Assumption 7 requires variation in Ut that produces local variation in entry. For
example, this rules out trivial cases in which Ut has no effect on Nt . Assumption 8
requires variation in the instrument Zt that can induce local variation in the support
of the entry outcomes, at least at some values of Xt .
13

We prove the following results in Appendix B.
Lemma 2. Under Assumptions 1–8, for all n ≥ n, all (x, z) ∈ Y (n), and all (x0 , z 0 ) ∈
Y (n), γ (x, τn (x, z)) − γ (x0 , τn−1 (x0 , z 0 )) is identified.
Lemma 3. Under Assumptions 1–8, for all n ≥ n and all (x, z) ∈ Y (n), the values
of γ (x, τn−1 (x, z)) and γ (x, τn (x, z)) are identified.
By Theorem 1, the values of τn−1 (x, z) and τn (x, z) are known for all n and
(x, z) ∈ Y (n). Thus, Lemma 3 demonstrates identification of γ (x, u) at each x ∈ X
and u ∈ Ux . In general, this may still deliver only partial identification of the index
function γ, so that in practice one may rely on parametric structure to interpolate
between the points {x ∈ X, u ∈ Ux } at which γ (x, u) is nonparametrically point
identified. However, the following conditions are sufficient to ensure that no such
interpolation is necessary.
Assumption 9. (a) For all x ∈ X, suppZt |Xt = x is connected.
(b) For all (x, z, u) ∈ Y× (0, 1) and all δ > 0 such that (u − δ, u + δ) ⊂ (0, 1),
there exists  > 0 such that if kz 0 − zk <  then η (x, z 0 , u0 ) = η (x, z, u) for some
u0 ∈ (u − δ, u + δ).
Assumption 10. For every x ∈ X there exists a finite partition 0 = τ 0 (x) < τ 1 (x) <
· · · < τ K(x) (x) = 1 of the unit interval such that for each k = 1, . . . , K(x) and some


z(k), z 0 (k) ∈suppZt |Xt = x, η x, z(k), τ k−1 (x) > η x, z 0 (k), τ k (x) .
Assumption 9 requires continuously distributed instruments and a type of continuous substitution between Zt and Ut in the “production” of bidder entry: it must be
possible to offset the effect (on entry) of a small change in Zt with a small change in
Ut . Assumption 10 requires that variation in Zt have sufficient effect on participation
to offset some discrete variation in the unobservable Ut . A sufficient condition is that
for each x there exist z and z 0 such that η (x, z, τn−1 (x, z)) > η (x, z 0 , τn (x, z)) for all
14


n ∈ {n (x, z) , . . . , n (x, z)}; in this case, the set τn(x,z)−1 , . . . , τn(x,z) could define the
partition τ 0 (x) < τ 1 (x) < · · · < τ K (x).
The following lemma, whose proof is provided in Appendix B, leads us to the
point identification of γ (and therefore Γ) demonstrated in Theorem 2.
Lemma 4. Under Assumptions 1–9, τn−1 (Xt , Zt ) is continuous in Zt on the preimage of (0, 1) .
Theorem 2. Under Assumptions 1–10, Γ is identified on X × [0, 1] .
Proof. We need only show that Ux = [0, 1] for each x ∈ X. For arbitrary x ∈
X, let 0 = τ 0 (x) < τ 1 (x) < · · · < τ K(x) (x) = 1 be as in Assumption 10. Take
any k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , K(x)} and let z = z(k) and z 0 = z 0 (k) be as in Assumption



10. Let n = η x, z, τ k−1 (x) . Because η x, z, τ k−1 (x) > η x, z 0 , τ k (x) , we have

η x, z 0 , τ k (x) < n and, therefore,
τn−1 (x, z) ≤ τ k−1 (x) < τ k (x) ≤ τn−1 (x, z 0 ).

Because the continuous image of a connected set is connected, Lemma 4 and Assump

tion 9 (part (a)) then imply that for every τ̃ ∈ τ k−1 (x), τ k (x) there exists z τ̃ such

that τn−1 x, z τ̃ = τ̃ .


3.3

Identification of the Bidding Model

We now demonstrate identification of the joint distribution of the pivotal expected
values (w(S1t ; n, x, u), . . . , w(Snt ; n, x, u)) for all x ∈ X, u ∈ [0, 1], and n in the support of Nt |{Xt = x, Ut = u}. For a private values model, where Vit = Sit , this is
equivalent to identification of the joint distribution of bidder valuations conditional
on (Xt , Nt , Ut ). Thus, Theorem 3 below demonstrates identification of the affiliated
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private values model. Without the restriction to private values, our result here provides an important form of partial identification.17 For our empirical application, for
example, this is sufficient to allow us to test the hypothesis of equilibrium bidding in
the affiliated values model, to test the hypothesis of private values against the alternative of common values, to examine the potential gains from changes in the auction
format, and to assess the effects of competition on bidder market power.18
Let




GM |B (m|b, x, u, n) = Pr max Bjt ≤ m Bit = b, Xt = x, Ut = u, Nt = n ,
j6=i

and let gM |B (m|b, x, u, n) denote the associated conditional density (guaranteed to
exist by Assumption 2 and strict monotonicity of the equilibrium bid function). Following Laffont and Vuong (1993), Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000), and Li, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000, 2002), one can characterize the relationship between each
realized w(sit ; nt , xt , ut ) and the associated equilibrium bid bit = β (sit ; xt , ut , nt ) in
terms of the joint distribution of equilibrium bids. In particular, each bit must satisfy
the first-order condition19

w(sit ; nt , xt , ut ) = bit +

GM |B (bit |bit , xt , ut , nt )
.
gM |B (bit |bit , xt , ut , nt )

(7)

Although this equation expresses the pivotal expected value w(sit ; nt , xt , ut ) as a
functional of a conditional distribution of bids, the presence of ut on the right-hand
side creates challenges. Because realizations of Ut are not observable or identified,
one cannot directly condition on them to identify the functions GM |B and gM |B .
17

Without additional information or structure, common values models are not identified from
bidding data. See, e.g., Laffont and Vuong (1993) and Athey and Haile (2002).
18

Tang (2011) shows how the joint distribution of pivotal expected values can be used to bound
counterfactual revenues in standard auctions with binding reserve prices.
19

See, e.g., Athey and Haile (2007) for a derivation in the affiliated values model.
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This precludes obtaining identification directly from (7). With the preceding results,
however, we can overcome this problem.
Observe that, like valuations and bids, the pivotal expected values w(sit ; nt , xt , ut )
will have the separable structure
w(sit ; nt , xt , ut ) = w0 (sit ; nt )Γ(xt , ut ),

(8)

where


0
w (sit ; nt ) ≡ E Vit Sit = max Sjt = sit , Nt = nt .
0

j6=i

We will refer to w0 (sit ; nt ) as bidder i’s “homogenized pivotal expected value” at
auction t. The first-order condition (7) can then be written as
w0 (sit ; nt ) = b0it +

GM 0 |B 0 (b0it |b0it , nt )
gM 0 |B 0 (b0it |b0it , nt )

(9)

where

GM 0 |B 0 (m|b, nt ) = Pr

0
max Bjt
j6=i

≤m

Bit0


= b, Nt = n

and gM 0 |B 0 (m|b, nt ) is the associated conditional density.
Let B̃it = ln (Bit ) and B̃it0 = ln (Bit0 ). By Assumption 3,
B̃it = B̃it0 + γ (Xt , Ut ) .

(10)

Furthermore, B̃it0 and γ (Xt , Ut ) are independent conditional on Nt , Xt . Lemma 5
(proved in Appendix B) shows that under the following regularity condition, Theorem
2 and a standard deconvolution argument yield identification of the joint distribution
0
0
of (B1t
, . . . , Bnt
) for all n.20

20

Under a slight strengthening of Assumption 3, requiring the support of Γ(x, Ut ) to be compact
at some x, Assumption 11 is guaranteed to hold (see, e.g., Krasnokutskaya (2011)).
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Assumption 11. For some x ∈ X the random variable γ (x, Ut ) has nonzero characteristic function almost everywhere.
Lemma 5. Under Assumptions 1–11, conditional on any Nt = n, the joint density
0
0
of (B1t
, . . . , Bnt
) is identified.

This leads directly to our main identification result.
Theorem 3. Let Assumptions 1–11 hold. Then for all x ∈ X, u ∈ [0, 1], and n ≥ 2 in
the support of Nt |{Xt = x}, the joint distribution of (w(S1t ; n, x, u), . . . , w(Snt ; n, x, u))
is identified.
Proof. Fix n. From (9), we have
w0 (Sit ; n) = ξ(Bit0 ; n) ≡ Bit0 +

GM 0 |B 0 (Bit0 |Bit0 , n)
.
gM 0 |B 0 (Bit0 |Bit0 , n)

(11)

0
0
By Lemma 5, the joint distribution (ξ(B1t
; n), . . . , ξ(Bnt
; n)) is known. This implies

identification of the joint distribution of (w0 (S1t ; n), . . . , w0 (Snt ; n)). The result then
follows immediately from (8) and Theorem 2.

4



Estimation

We propose a two-stage semiparametric estimation strategy. The first stage involves semiparametric sieve quasi-maximum likelihood estimation (QMLE) of the
entry thresholds τ` (x, z), the index function γ, and the joint distributions of homogenized equilibrium bids. In the second stage, for each level of bidder entry, we estimate
the joint distribution of homogenized pivotal expected values by plugging draws from
the estimated distribution of homogenized bids into the auction first-order condition
and constructing the empirical distribution of the resulting pseudo-sample.

18

4.1

Stage 1: Sieve-QMLE

Let θτ denote the parameters of the entry model, θγ the parameters of the index
function γ, and θB the parameters of the joint distributions of log homogenized bids.
Let
L1t (nt ; θτ ) = Pr(Nt = nt |Xt = xt , Zt = zt ; θτ )
denote the (conditional on (xt , zt )) likelihood for the entry outcome in auction t. Let

L2t (bt |nt ; θγ , θB , θτ )

denote the likelihood of the observed bids at auction t, conditional on the entry outcome nt (and on (xt , zt )). Defining θ = (θτ , θγ , θB ), the conditional quasi-likelihood21
function for the observed outcomes {(nt , bt )}Tt=1 can be written
L(θ) =

Y

L1t (nt ; θτ )L2t (bt |nt ; θγ , θB , θτ ).

t

We give details of our empirical specification and the two components of the quasilikelihood in sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 below. Estimates of the parameter vector θ can
be obtained by maximizing L(θ). Because θτ is identified from the entry outcomes
Q
alone, it is also possible to split the QMLE stage, first maximizing t L1t (θτ ) to
Q
estimate θτ , then maximizing t L2t (θγ , θB , θ̂τ ) conditional on θ̂τ . In our data, the
two approaches yield very similar estimates. However, because we found the two-step
QMLE procedure to be more numerically stable in bootstrap samples, below we will
report results using the two-step version.
Consistency can be confirmed by adapting the results of White and Wooldridge
(1991) for sieve-extremum estimators with weakly dependent time series data to the
21

Recall that we permit spatial dependence.
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case of weak spatial dependence.22 To conduct inference, we use a nonparametric block bootstrap procedure that captures both dependence among bids within an
auction and spatial dependence between the unobservables Ut across auctions. Specifically, we re-sample auctions with replacement, taking all bids from the selected auction, and including in the bootstrap sample all auctions on neighbor tracts as well.
Following HPP, we re-sample weighting auctions by factors inversely proportional to
the number of auctions in the neighborhood of the tract.23
4.1.1

Entry Thresholds

Our entry model above reduces to an ordered response model where, given Xt = x
and Zt = z, we have Nt = n if and only if Ut ∈ (τn−1 (x, z) , τn (x, z)). Given any
strictly increasing univariate CDF H we can rewrite this as

{Nt = n|Xt = x, Zt = z} ⇐⇒ {At ∈ (αn−1 (x, z) , αn (x, z))} ,
where At ∼ H and αn (x, z) = H −1 (τn (x, z)).
We specify a linear threshold function

αn (x, z) = αn − xαx − zαz
22

In particular, we represent tract locations by points in Z2 . Then, under a standard “expanding
domain” asymptotics, White and Wooldridge’s uniform consistency result for stationary α-mixing
time series data (Corollary 2.6) can be extended using a Bernstein-type inequality for α-mixing
random fields on Z2 (e.g., Yao (2003)).
23

Similar results are obtained without weighting. Applying the results of van der Vaart and Wellner
(1996) and Lahiri (2003), one can verify validity of the bootstrap when we interpret our finite-sample
estimator as that for a parametric model. General conditions for consistency of bootstrap inference
procedures for sieve M-estimators in the i.i.d. setting can be found, e.g., in Ma and Kosorok (2005)
and Chen and Pouzo (2009). See also Chen and Liao (2014), and Chen, Liao, and Sun (2014) in the
case of time series data.
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and specify H as the standard normal CDF, yielding an ordered probit model.24
Letting θτ = ({αn }n−1
n=n , αx , αz ), we then have
L1t (n; θτ ) = H (αn (xt , zt ; θτ ) ; θτ ) − H (αn−1 (xt , zt ; θτ ) ; θτ ) .

4.1.2

Index Function and Homogenized Bid Distribution

Given our focus on testing for common values, we prioritize flexibility in how the joint
distribution and density of bids can vary with n when specifying the second part of
the quasi-likelihood. We specify the index function γ parametrically as γ(·, ·; θγ );
we will use a linear specification below. For each value of n, the joint density of
log homogenized bids is specified semiparametrically, using a parametric copula and
a nonparametric (Bernstein polynomial sieve) specification of the common marginal
distribution.25 Below we specify a Gaussian copula, with separate covariance parameter ρn for each n.26
We specify the marginal density of a generic bidder’s log homogenized bid in an
n-bidder auction as
0

g̃Bi0 (b̃ ; θb , n) =

m
X

(j)
θb,n

    
qj,m Φ b̃0 φ b̃0 ,

(12)

j=0
24

Thus, although the theoretical model of entry in Example 1 follows Berry (1992), the induced
empirical model of the entry stage is similar to that of Bresnahan and Reiss (1991). In Appendix
D we consider a variation in which H is specified using a Hermite polynomial series approximation,
following Gallant and Nychka (1987).
25

See, e.g., Chen, Fan, and Tsyrennikov (2006). Prior work using Bernstein polynomials in estimation of auction models includes Komarova (2017) and Kong (2017a,b). Hubbard, Paarsch, and
Li (2012) have previously combined a parametric copula and nonparametric (kernel) specification of
marginal densities to estimate auction models.
26

Our use of a parametric copula reflects in part our choice to let the distribution of bids be fully
flexible (i.e., even in finite sample) with respect to the number of bidders nt . In other applications
one might specify a Bernstein copula and account for the effects of nt within the sieve approximation.
As we discuss in Appendix H, the Gaussian copula provides a substantial computational advantage
when we transform our estimated joint distributions and densities to the conditional distributions
and densities that are plugged into bidders’ first-order conditions.
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where qj,m (ν) =

m
j



ν j (1 − ν)m−j and Φ(·) and φ(·) denote the standard normal

distribution and density functions, respectively. Here m is a parameter, growing with
the sample size, that determines the order of the Bernstein polynomial approximation.
(j)

n
Let θb,n = {θb,n }m
j=0 . Thus, the parameter vector θb in (12) represents {θb,n }n=n .

Because Bernstein polynomials approximate functions with domain [0, 1], in (12)
we use Bernstein polynomials to approximate the marginal density of the transformed
variable Φ(b̃0 ).27 This transformation is useful not only for standardizing the domain
but also for ensuring that the nonparametric estimator will offer sensible approximations even in modest sample sizes. When m = 0, for example, the distribution of
log-bids will be normal. Thus, the nonparametric component of our specification is
based on a sequence of approximating models that starts with a natural (lognormal)
parametric specification and adds flexibility as permitted by the sample size.
Let G̃Bi0 (b̃0 ; θb , n) denote the CDF associated with g̃Bi0 (b̃0 ; θb , n). Let χ(·; ρn ) denote the symmetric Gaussian copula density with covariance parameter ρn .28 We
specify the joint density of the log homogenized bids in n-bidder auctions as

g̃B 0



χ





b̃01 , . . . , b̃0n ; θb,n , ρn , n

=

G̃Bi0 (b̃01 ; θb,n , n), . . . , G̃Bi0 (b̃0n ; θb,n , n); ρn



g̃Bi0 (b̃01 ; θb,n , n) . . . g̃Bi0 (b̃0n ; θb,n , n). (13)

27

We use the normalization γ(0, 0) = 0 (recall (1)). For estimation purposes, however, we add
intercepts γn0 t for each value of nt to the index function γ(xt , ut ; θγ ), implying that in this step the
joint densities we estimate are actually those of centered log homogenized bids b̃0t − γn0 t . We then
adjust the location of each estimated density by the appropriate intercept estimate to obtain the
density of (uncentered) log homogenized bids that is relevant to bidders’ first-order conditions. When
homogenization is performed via OLS, this type of centering procedure is required for consistency
(see HHS and Athey and Haile (2007)). In our case this is not essential but offers several practical
advantages by ensuring that the log homogenized bids are centered at zero prior to transformation
by the normal CDF, ensuring that the location of the estimated bid distribution can move freely
with nt , and freeing the Bernstein coefficients to capture features of the marginal density other than
its location.
28

The
symmetric
Gaussian
density
χ (h1 , . . . , hn ; ρn )
is
given
by

 copula

exp − 21 ϕ(h)0 Υ−1 − I ϕ(h) , where ϕ(h) = Φ−1 (h1 ) , . . . , Φ−1 (hn ) and the matrix
Υ has ones on the diagonal and covariance ρn in all off-diagonal entries.
1
|Υ|1/2
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We discuss computational details in Appendix H.
Letting ρ = {ρn }nn=n and θB = (θb , ρ), we have
τnt (xt ,zt ;θτ )



g̃b0 b̃1t − γ(xt , u; θγ ), . . . , b̃nt t − γ(xt , u; θγ ); θb,nt , ρnt , nt

τnt −1 (xt ,zt ;θτ )

τnt (xt , zt ; θτ ) − τnt −1 (xt , zt ; θτ )

Z
L2t (bt |nt ; θ) =

du,
(14)

where τnt −1 (xt , zt ; θτ ) and τnt (xt , zt ; θτ ) denote the bounds on ut implied by the entry
model parameters θτ .29 We approximate the integral by Monte Carlo simulation.

4.2

Stage 2: Invert Equilibrium First-Order Conditions

Given the first-stage estimates of the index function γ and joint distribution of homogenized bids, estimation of the relevant auction primitives is straightforward and
does not involve further use of the data. Here we use the equilibrium first-order condition (9), which can be written in terms of the distribution of log homogenized bids
as
 
G̃M |B (b̃0it |b̃0it , nt )
w0 (sit ; nt ) = exp b̃0it
1+
g̃M |B (b̃0it |b̃0it , nt )

!
,

(15)

where G̃M |B (b̃0it |b̃0it , nt ) and g̃M |B (b̃0it |b̃0it , nt ) are, respectively, the CDF and pdf of
0
conditional on B̃it0 = b̃0it .
maxj6=i B̃jt

For each value of Nt = n, we transform the estimated joint distributions and densities obtained from stage 1 to construct the conditional distributions and densities
appearing (15) (see Appendix H). Then we draw log homogenized bids from their
estimated marginal distributions and plug these into (15), yielding pseudo-samples
29
When nt = 1 one may set L2t (bt |nt ; θ) = 1 by convention, since our baseline model of competitive
bidding does not imply an interpretation of the quantity b̃it − γ(xt , ut ) in that case. Alternatively,
because we specify different parameters θb,n for each value of n, (14) gives a correct expression for
L2t (bt |nt ; θ) for nt = 1 whenever bids in 1-bidder auctions are assumed to inherit the separable
structure required of valuations. Below we develop an extension incorporating a random reserve
price, where this separability is an implication of equilibrium behavior. Therefore, given the large
number of one-bidder auctions in our sample, we include these in the quasi-maximum likelihood
estimation using (14) for all specifications.
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of the vectors (w0 (s1t ; n), . . . , w0 (snt ; n)) for many simulated auctions t. The empirical distribution of these pseudo-draws provides a consistent estimate of the joint
distribution of homogenized pivotal expected values for n-bidder auction. Although
these joint distributions will suffice for our application, the pseudo-draws can also
be scaled by the estimated value of the index Γ(x, u) in order to estimated the joint
distributions of (non-homogenized) pivotal expected values given Xt = x and Ut = u.
In a private values setting, for example, this would yield an estimate of the joint
distribution of bidder valuations.

5
5.1

OCS Auctions
Background and Data

We apply our method to first-price sealed bid auctions of oil and gas leases in the U.S.
Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) held between 1954 and 1983. Extensive discussion of
the OCS auctions can be found in, e.g., Gilley and Karels (1981), Hendricks and
Porter (1988), Hendricks, Porter, and Spady (1989), and HPP. For a more complete
institutional background we refer readers to that prior work, upon which we rely
heavily ourselves. Briefly, however, auctions were held for the right to lease a specified
tract for exploration and production of oil, gas, and other minerals. The seller in these
auctions was the Mineral Management Service (“MMS”), at that time an agency of
the U.S. Department of the Interior. Tracts in the sample typically cover a rectangular
area (a “block”) of 5,000–5,760 acres in the Gulf of Mexico.30 Production on a tract
was subject to royalty payments from the leaseholder at a pre-specified rate, usually
30

We limit attention to tracts of at least 4,000 acres. Smaller tracts are typically half-blocks or
quarter-blocks, where several of our measures of neighborhood characteristics would have interpretations different from those on standard tracts. We also drop auctions with missing values for our
covariates.
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1/6. Bids at an auction were offers of an additional up-front “bonus” payment for
the right to become the leaseholder.
No exploratory drilling was permitted prior to the auction, although in some
cases exploration and production would already have occurred on neighbor tracts and
would be publicly observable. Bids would also reflect information obtained through
evaluation of data from magnetic, gravity, and seismic surveys.31 Although initial
collection of survey data was often funded jointly, firms relied on their own experts
for modeling and analysis of the data and often performed follow-up surveys of the
tracts on which they intended to bid. Differences in expert assessments of the survey
data are likely an important source of heterogeneity in bidder beliefs about the value
of a given tract (HPP). These features lead us to treat bidder entry as a decision to
acquire a costly signal about the value of the tract (recall Example 1).
We have data on all auctions attracting at least one bidder.32 Table 1 shows
the number of auctions in our sample by number of bidders. We do not separate
wildcat, development, and drainage tracts; instead, we account directly for the presence of active neighbor leases and neighbor production, and we allow asymmetry
between neighbor vs. non-neighbor costs of signal acquisition in a way that generalizes the structure considered in Hendricks and Porter (1988) (see Example 1).33 Like
Aradillas-Lopez, Haile, Hendricks, and Porter (2019), we model bidders as symmetric
conditional on acquisition of a signal. Thus, while bidders may decide not to acquire
a signal through analysis of the seismic data and may reach different conclusions from
such analysis, the technology producing signals is modeled as symmetric across firms.
Formal tests, developed in Appendix C, fail to reject the symmetry assumption.
31

See, e.g., “G&G Data Acquisition and Analysis” at https://www.boem.gov/Oil-and-GasEnergy-Program/Resource-Evaluation/Geological-and-Geophysical-Data-Acquisition/GGDataGeophysical-Surveys.aspx, March 24, 2018.
32

Appendix A demonstrates that with the model of entry and bidding given in Example 1, our
maintained assumptions remain valid in the presence of this sample selection.
33

As a robustness check, we also examine the subset of auctions that excludes drainage tracts.
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Table 1: Sample Sizes
n

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11–17

Tn

814

498

293

229

172

127

100

73

56

56

128

Tn denotes the number of auctions in our sample with n bidders.

The MMS sometimes announced a small minimum acceptable bid of $10–$25 per
acre; the MMS also retained the option to reject all bids when it deemed the auction
to be noncompetitive. Such rejections were rare in our sample except at auctions
attracting only one bid (see section D.1). We initially treat both the announced
minimum bid and the MMS bid rejection policy as nonbinding, as in Li, Perrigne,
and Vuong (2000). However, we also consider a variation of the model in which the
MMS bid rejection policy is modeled with a random secret reserve price.
Limited forms of joint bidding were permitted in these auctions. Following the
prior literature, we model each bid as coming from a generic “bidder,” which might be
solo firm or a bidding consortium.34 Typically a given tract will have eight neighbors,
only some (or none) of which will be “active” (under lease). Our measure of the
number of neighbor firms (distinct owners of leases on adjacent tracts) accounts for the
presence of joint bidding by linking together firms that have bid together previously
in the same neighborhood, following the criteria developed by Aradillas-Lopez, Haile,
Hendricks, and Porter (2019).
Our tract characteristics Xt , all measured as of the time of the auction, include the
number of active neighbor leases, whether the tract is isolated (no active neighbors),
the number of firms that bid for neighbor leases, whether the tract was offered previously (attracting no bidders or being relinquished by a prior leaseholder), whether a
lease has expired on a neighbor tract, the number of neighbor tracts previously drilled,
34

Hendricks and Porter (1992) and Hendricks, Porter, and Tan (2008) examine empirical and
theoretical aspects of joint bidding in these auctions.
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the number of “hits” on neighbor tracts, average water depth (and its square), and
the royalty rate associated with the lease. We present a summary of these auction
characteristics in Table 2. Below we will also incorporate year fixed effects.

Table 2: Summary Statistics
Variable

Mean

Median

Std Dev

# active neighbor leases
isolated lease indicator
# firms that bid for neighbors
re-offered tract indicator
neighbor expired indicator
# neighbor tracts drilled
# neighbor hits
water depth (thousands of ft)
royalty rate (%)
# neighbor firms

1.48
0.59
2.37
0.20
0.31
1.69
0.65
0.20
16.10
0.89

0.00
1.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
1.00
0.00
0.14
16.00
0.00

1.96
0.49
3.56
0.40
0.46
2.25
1.30
0.28
1.35
1.27

Following Example 1, we consider one instrument for participation: the number of
neighbor firms.35 bidder entry because ownership of a neighbor tract is likely to reduce
the cost of assessing the value of the current tract. As discussed in Appendix A, when
we condition on the number of neighbor tracts and the set of firms that previously
bid for those tracts, variation in the number of neighbor firms is determined entirely
by the realizations of bidder signals at prior auctions, and therefore independent of
Ut under our maintained assumptions. Table 2 includes summary statistics for this
instrument.
35

Because this instrument has limited discrete support, our identification results suggest that we
may rely on functional form to fill in the gaps between the points at which the index function Γ is
nonparametrically identified.
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5.2

Baseline Model Estimates

Here we report estimates of the entry model, index function, and joint distribution
of equilibrium bids, using our baseline empirical specification. We estimate the joint
distributions of log homogenized bids using a Bernstein polynomial approximation of
order m = 4 and Gaussian copula.36 In general we estimate separate joint distributions for each value of nt . However, for large values of nt we observe relatively few
auctions (recall Table 1), leading us to assume that all auctions with nt ≥ 11 share
the same marginal distribution of homogenized bids and the same copula correlation
parameter. Combined with the ordered probit specification of the entry model, this
leads to a baseline specification with 151 parameters.
5.2.1

Entry Model

Table 3 shows our estimates of the entry model parameters. We also report both the
standard parametric standard error estimates (“SE”), which ignore spatial dependence, and standard errors obtained from the spatial block bootstrap (“SE (BB)”).37
As discussed in section 2 (see also Appendix A), the function η characterizes the effect
of Zt on entry but generally will not reveal the effects of Xt . Thus one must interpret the estimated coefficients on Xt with caution. However, the coefficient on Zt is
positive (consistent with the prediction of our motivating example) and statistically
significant, supporting its value in providing a source of variation in bidder entry.
36

Our choice of m reflects our experience with the tradeoff between flexibility an precision using
similar sample sizes in our Monte Carlo simulations. We obtain similar results with slightly larger
or smaller values of m, although the precision of the estimates declines as we add parameters.
37

We report results based on 800 bootstrap replications throughout.
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Table 3: Entry Model Estimates
Est.

5.2.2

SE

SE (BB)

# active leases
isolated lease
# firms that bid for neighbors
reoffered tract
neighbor expired
# neighbors drilled
# neighbor hits
depth
depth squared
royalty rate
time controls

X

-0.089
0.518
0.016
-0.201
-0.044
-0.046
0.076
-0.558
0.120
-0.002
Sale

0.028
0.033
0.089
0.100
0.011
0.012
0.065
0.075
0.070
0.079
0.028
0.030
0.028
0.027
0.179
0.283
0.068
0.132
0.017
0.022
year dummies

# neighbor firms

Z

0.1743

0.0414

0.0446

Index Function and Bid Distribution

Table 4 displays estimates of the index parameters γx and γu , along with their estimated standard errors. We again caution that the estimated coefficients on Xt do
not have the usual causal interpretations. However, the estimates indicate a strong
effect of the unobserved heterogeneity on bids. Because Ut is normalized to have a
uniform distribution, the coefficient implies that a one standard deviation increase in
Ut drives up bids (and valuations) by roughly 33%.
We will not report estimates of the Bernstein polynomial parameters. However,
Table 5 shows our estimates of the Gaussian copula correlation parameters ρn . The
point estimates are positive, consistent with our assumption of positive dependence
between bidders’ private information. Although the point estimates generally suggest greater correlation at higher levels of competition, a Wald test fails to reject
the hypothesis of equal copula correlation for all values of n.38 However, a Wald
38

While not statistically distinguishable from the others, the estimated correlation parameter for
the nine-bidder auctions stands out. A close examination of the data revealed no clear explanation
for this. We do not use auctions with more than seven bidders in our tests for common values below,
and results are similar when we omit auctions with nt > 7 from the estimation altogether.
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Table 4: Index Function Estimates
Est.

SE

SE (BB)

# active leases
isolated lease
# firms that bid for neighbors
reoffered tract
neighbor expired
# neighbors drilled
# neighbor hits
depth
depth squared
royalty rate
time controls

X

0.016
0.042
0.029
-0.167
-0.280
0.049
-0.022
-0.224
0.092
-0.006
Sale

0.018
0.021
0.059
0.087
0.008
0.011
0.047
0.067
0.047
0.067
0.019
0.024
0.020
0.025
0.135
0.269
0.064
0.118
0.010
0.017
year dummies

unobserved heterogeneity

U

1.136

0.273

0.351

test strongly rejects (p-value < 0.001) the null that all ρn are zero. Because homogenized bids are strictly increasing functions of signals, this implies rejection of the
hypothesis of independent bidder types. This finding is of some importance on its
own. Common knowledge unobservables and correlated private information are two
distinct phenomena with different implications for behavior and policy. Often only
one of these two sources of correlation between bids has been permitted in applications. Also important, however, is that the estimated correlation is generally small,
suggesting modest correlation of bidders’ private information. As we discuss below,
this can have significant implications for auction design.
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Table 5: Copula Correlation Estimates

5.3

n

Est.

SE

SE (BB)

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11- 18

0.044
0.031
0.089
0.136
0.112
0.111
0.133
0.295
0.161
0.109

0.041
0.029
0.031
0.030
0.035
0.044
0.039
0.071
0.052
0.025

0.050
0.040
0.032
0.041
0.037
0.043
0.040
0.067
0.068
0.020

Decomposition of Correlation and Variance

Correlated private information is just one reason bids are correlated within an auction:
auction observables and unobservables also play a role. Our model estimates allow
us to assess the relative contributions of each factor. We present a decomposition in
Table 6, which also shows a decomposition of the overall variance of bids.39 Figures in
the first column, labeled “log Bit0 ,” are for the homogenized log bids. Here the pairwise
correlation reflects the correlation among signals, the nonlinearity of the bidding
strategy (and log transformation), and the fact that, all else equal, bid levels vary
with the number of competitors in the auction. Similarly, the variance in this column
reflects the variability in bidders’ assessments of tract values, as well as variation in
bidding strategies across auctions with different numbers of entrants.
A natural way to characterize the contributions of unobservables is with the correlation/variance arising from variation in γ(x, Ut ) at a representative value of x. With
our linear specification of γ, this variation is identical for all x. In the second column,
labeled “log Bit0 + γu Ut ,” we add the contribution of auction-level unobservables.
39

We measure the “within-auction pairwise correlation” with the Pearson correlation coefficient
for pairs of bids within the same auction.
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Table 6: Decomposition of Log Bid Correlation and Variance

log Bit0

log Bit0 + γu Ut

log Bit0 + γu Ut + Xt0 γx

log Bit

Within-Auction Pairwise Correlation
0.133

0.210

0.222

0.425

1.693

2.292

Variance
1.520

1.669

After accounting for the contributions of the log homogenized bids and unobservable Ut , all remaining correlation/variance in the log bids reflects auction observables.
Again exploiting our linear specification of γ, the third column of the table, labeled
“log Bit0 + γu Ut + Xt0 γx ,” adds only the variation due to auction-level covariates. The
final column, labeled “log Bit ,” then adds the contribution of the year fixed effects to
yield the total correlation and variance of the equilibrium bids.40 Given our wide time
span, it is not surprising that the fixed effects account for a substantial portion of
the correlation and variance. More interesting is a comparison of the contributions of
the auction-level covariates and the auction-level unobservables. The the estimated
contribution of the unobservables is roughly six times as large as that of the observed
covariates. This is particularly noteworthy because we selected covariates Xt from
an unusually rich set of observables based in part on explanatory power in descriptive analysis of bids. Unobserved heterogeneity could be even more important in
applications where only a limited set of covariates is available.
40

Unlike the rest of the decomposition, the order of these last two steps could matter, due to
correlation between the covariates and fixed effects. Here, reversing the order has virtually no effect
on the implied contributions to the within-auction correlation; however it increases the contribution
of the covariates to the bid variance: the impact of unobservables is then only three (rather than
six) times as large as that of the observed covariates.
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6

Tests For Common Values

6.1

Testing Approach

Using the estimates above, we test the null hypothesis of private values against the
alternative of common values, relying on the following additional assumption.
Assumption 12. For all n = 2, . . . , n − 1,
FS,V 0 (S1t , . . . , Snt , V1t0 , . . . , Vnt0 |Nt = n) = FS,V 0 (S1t , . . . , Snt , V1t0 , . . . , Vnt0 |Nt = n + 1).
This is an assumption that Ut is the only source of dependence between the number
of bidders at auction t and their valuations/signals. Thus, for example, holding
(Xt , Ut ) fixed, variation in Nt is not associated with variation in the valuations or
in the precision of signals. Given this condition, HHS showed that the homogenized
pivotal expected values w0 (Sit ; n) are unaffected by n in a private values auction but
decreasing in n in a common values auction (see also Athey and Haile (2002)). This
distinction reflects the winner’s curse, which is present in (and only in) common values
auctions, and which becomes more severe as the number of competitors increases
(all else equal).41 HHS also pointed out that under the maintained assumptions
of the affiliated values auction model, w0 (Sit ; n) must be weakly decreasing in n.
Because violations of this requirement indicate a rejection of at least one of our
maintained hypotheses, this allows a test of the maintained assumptions, including
that of equilibrium bidding.42
To perform the tests, we first construct estimates of the marginal distributions
Fw (·; n) of homogenized pivotal expected values conditional on Nt = n, following the
41

We use the term “winner’s curse” to describe the adverse selection faced by a bidder competing
against others with informative signals, not to errors or regret on the part of a bidder.
42

Another testable implication of the maintained hypotheses is that the inverse homogenized
bid functions—i.e., the right-hand-side of the first order conditions (15)—be strictly increasing as
functions of the log homogenized bid (see Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000)). We find no violation
of this requirement, even before allowing for sampling error (see Figure 2 below.)
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procedure discussed in section 4. We then subject the estimated distributions to tests
of the null hypothesis of equality (private values),

H0 :

Fw (w; n) = Fw (w; n + 1) ∀w, n = 2, . . . , 6,

against the one-sided alterative of first-order stochastic dominance (common values),

H1 :

Fw (w; n) ≤ Fw (w; n + 1) ∀w, n = 2, . . . , 6,

with the inequality strict for at least some n and w. We limit attention to auctions
with at most seven bidders in part to ensure that we have a sample of at least 100
auctions for each value of n considered.43 An additional reason, however, is that
growth in the severity of the winner’s curse with the level of competition tends to
diminish quickly as n grows. Intuitively, once a bidder assumes that n − 1 others
have low signals, learning that one additional signal is low conveys little “bad news”
unless n is small. Thus, with common values, pivotal expected values are decreasing
and, typically, convex in n.44 This intuitive feature leads us to expect any evidence
for common values to be clearest when comparing distributions at the lowest values
n to those at higher levels of n.
We compare pairs of distributions using the one-sided Cramér-Von Mises type
statistic
Z

∞

CV M =

h

F̂w (w; N1 ) − F̂w (w; N2 )

−∞

i2

dw,

(16)

+

where [y]+ = y × 1{y > 0} and F̂w (w; N) is the estimated distribution of w0 (Sit ; Nt )
conditional on Nt lying in a range of values defined by a set N. We focus primarily on
43

Abusing notation slightly, we let n (without an index) represent the number of bidders in a
non-specific auction rather than referring repeatedly to “the number of bidders.”
44

This convexity holds in all examples of symmetric common values auctions we are aware of. An
interesting question is whether additional assumptions are needed to prove this as a general property.

34

sets N containing two adjacent values of n (“coarse binning”). This pooling is done to
reduce the impact of sampling error. However, by combining n = 2 and n = 3, where
we expect the largest change in the severity of the winner’s curse, this pooling may
hide the strongest evidence of common values. Thus, we will also consider singleton
sets (“fine binning”). In addition to pairwise tests, we will construct a single test
statistic for the full range n = 2, . . . , 7, based on the maximum statistic (or smoothed
maximum) over the pairwise statistics:

CV M

max

Z

∞

= max
j

h
i2
F̂w (w; Nj ) − F̂w (w; Nj+1 ) dw

(17)

+

−∞

Below we report results for the pairwise and “max” tests for coarse binning, as well
as the for the max test for fine binning.45 We construct p-values for the test statistics
using the distribution of (re-centered) test statistics from the spatial block bootstrap
procedure described above.

6.2

Results: Baseline Specification

In Figure 1a we show the estimated CDFs under coarse binning, where we compare
“low”(n ∈ {2, 3}), “medium” (n ∈ {4, 5}), and “high” (n ∈ {6, 7}) levels of competition. Under the null, these distributions should differ only due to sampling error,
whereas the alternative of common values implies that the CDFs will shift “northwest” as n increases. The estimated distributions shown here exhibit the stochastic
ordering implied by the common values model. Further, as expected, the gap between
the distributions for low and medium n is substantially larger than that between the
distributions for medium and high n. Table 7 shows the relative sizes of these shifts
(focusing on percentage changes) for the median homogenized pivotal expected val45

Appendix I provides the complete test results under fine binning. The strongest evidence for
common values (a p-value of 0.001) comes from comparisons of n = 2 to n = 3, where we expect the
change in severity of winner’s curse to be largest, and where we have the largest samples of auctions.
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ues in each of the three bins.46 As we shift from auctions with n ∈ {2, 3} to those
with n ∈ {4, 5}, the median pivotal expected value falls by about 14 percent. When
moving from n ∈ {4, 5} to n ∈ {6, 7}, the median falls by just under 3 percent.

Table 7: Competition and Median Pivotal Expected Values

Median Homogenized Pivotal Exp. Value
Change
Percent Change

n ∈ {2, 3}

n ∈ {4, 5}

n ∈ {6, 7}

1,067,371

915,437
151,933
14.2%

890,112
25,326
2.8%

Median homogenized pivotal expected values in 1982 dollars.

Contrast the patterns in Figure 1a with those in Figure 1b, which shows the
estimated distributions obtained when we estimate the model without allowing for
unobserved heterogeneity. Here the results suggest stochastic ordering in the direction
opposite that predicted by common values. This suggests a misspecified model.
Table 8 shows the p-values obtained from the formal tests. These results confirm
what was suggested by the figures above. First consider the comparison between low
n and medium n when we allow unobserved heterogeneity (“With UH”). The test for
common values implies rejection of private values in favor of common values, with
a p-value of 0.021. The smaller gap between the estimated CDFs for medium and
high n observed in Figure 1 cannot be statistically distinguished. However, the max
tests—for both coarse and fine binning—also imply rejection at significance levels
around 2 percent. Consistent with Figure 1, the specification test yields no evidence
suggesting misspecification in the model with unobserved heterogeneity.
46

Note that percentage changes in homogenized and non-homogenized pivotal expected values are
identical.
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Figure 1: Test for Common Values, Baseline Specification
(a) With Unobserved Heterogeneity

(b) Without Unobserved Heterogeneity

Note: Figures show estimated cumulative distributions of homogenized pivotal expected values.
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Table 8: Test p-values
Baseline Specification
Test for Common Values

{2,3} vs. {4,5}
{4,5} vs. {6,7}
Max (coarse binning)
Max (fine binning)

With UH

No UH

0.021
0.274
0.022
0.019

0.299
0.754
0.590
0.541

Specification Test

{2,3} vs. {4,5}
{4,5} vs. {6,7}
Max (coarse binning)
Max (fine binning)

With UH

No UH

0.906
0.901
0.985
0.922

0.066
0.076
0.081
0.239

Contrast these results with those obtained in the model without unobserved heterogeneity (“No UH”). Here, the conclusions are essentially reversed. Not only is
there no evidence of common values, but the specification tests suggest misspecification, with all three coarse binning tests yielding p-values below 0.10. Thus, at least in
our data, failing to account for unobserved heterogeneity tends to hide the presence
of common values and can erroneously suggest non-equilibrium bidding.
This is intuitive, but not a necessary implication of ignoring unobserved heterogeneity. On one hand, when we ignore unobserved heterogeneity and endogenous
entry, an “endogenous treatment” bias works against the winner’s curse effect we are
seeking to detect: auctions with more bidders may have a larger winner’s curse, but
they also have more favorable unobservables. This suggests that the true effects of
n on pivotal expected values could be masked or even reversed. But this intuition
is incomplete. The model is misspecified when unobserved heterogeneity is present
but ignored in the first-order conditions used to interpret the data. The cumulative
38

distributions recovered in that case are not those of bidders’ pivotal expected values. Moreover, the direction of the misspecification bias is unclear, and this bias may
vary with n. Nonetheless, the results indicate that ignoring unobserved heterogeneity
obscures the presence of common values in our sample.

6.3

Results under Alternative Specifications

We have explored the same testing strategies under several alternative specifications.
In particular, we have examined:
(a) an extension of the bidding model allowing for a random reserve price, representing the Mineral Management Service’s option to reject all bids;
(b) replacement of the ordered probit specification of the entry model with a seminonparametric estimator, following Gallant and Nychka (1987);
(c) dropping the year fixed effects from the index γ(xt , ut ), forcing unmeasured
time-varying factors affecting the auctions into the unobservable; and
(d) dropping all drainage tracts from the sample.
Detailed discussion and results are presented in Appendix D. These alternative
specifications lead to very similar patterns in the estimated distributions of pivotal
expected values and to the same broad conclusions from the formal tests.

7

Affiliation, Common Values, and Seller Revenue

The presence of affiliation and common values can have important implications for
auction design and for the way competition affects outcomes. Our estimates allow us
to quantify some of these implications in the context of the OCS auctions.
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7.1

Competition, Market Power, and Revenue

A well known feature of common value auctions is that added bidder competition
can lead, counterintuitively, to less aggressive bidding and even to reduced seller
revenue.47 The winner’s curse is a key force behind this possibility, although Pinkse
and Tan (2005) demonstrated that bids can decline in the level of competition due
to affiliation of signals alone. Here we use our estimates to examine the equilibrium
effects of bidder competition on bid shading, the level of bids, and seller revenue.
In Figure 2 we plot, for different values of n, bidders’ homogenized pivotal expected
values against the associated homogenized bids implied by the first-order condition
(9). Recall that pivotal expected values are strictly increasing in bidder types (signals). We know from theory that all types above the lowest shade their bids below
their pivotal expected values, and that the degree of bid shading is increasing in type.
Here we see that the estimated magnitude of this bid shading (reflecting bidders’
market power) is substantial—all curves lie well below the 45 degree line. However,
the gap shrinks as the level of competition rises from n = 2 to n = 7.
In Figure 3 we plot the estimated homogenized equilibrium bidding strategies
β 0 (·; n), where we normalize bidder signals to lie on [0, 1] without loss. These estimated bid functions are strictly increasing, as implied by the model (but not imposed).
They are also generally increasing with n—i.e., the effect of more intense competition generally dominates the effect of a more severe winner’s curse. Using the same
one-sided testing strategy used above, we reject (with a 10% significance threshold)
the null hypothesis of bid functions that are constant with respect to n in favor of
strategies that increase with n. Our point estimates suggest that this monotonicity
reverses at n = 7. Such a reversal is consistent with the folk wisdom that equilibrium
bids “eventually” decrease in the number of competitors in a common values auction
47

See, e.g., Laffont (1997) and Hong and Shum (2002).
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Figure 2: Competition and Bid Shading

Estimated pivotal expected values on horizontal axis with the associated
homogenized equilibrium bids on the vertical axis, both in 1982 dollars.

Figure 3: Competition and Equilibrium Bidding Strategies

Bidder signals (normalized to [0, 1] on the horizontal axis with the associated homogenized equilibrium bids (in 1982 dollars) on the vertical axis.
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(see, e.g., Laffont (1997)). However, even when comparing n = 6 to n = 7 in isolation,
formal tests fail to reject the null that bids are weakly increasing with n at standard
significance levels.
Finally, the second column (labeled “First-Price”) of Table 9 shows, at each value
of n, the implications of our estimates for a seller’s expected revenue. To put revenues in a natural scale, we use the median value of the estimated index γ(Xt , Ut ) in
our sample. Notably, even though our point estimates (Figure 3) suggested a nonmonotonicity of bidding with respect to n, this effect is overcome by the fact that
when n is larger the winning bid is the maximum among a larger number of bids.
Thus, even our point estimates give no indication that a seller would profit from
restricting entry to reduce the severity of the winner’s curse faced by bidders.

Table 9: Revenue Gains through the Linkage Principle

n

Expected Revenue
First-Price Second-Price

% gain

std. err.

2
3
4
5
6
7

7.02
9.21
11.48
14.95
16.91
16.94

7.05
9.31
11.79
15.64
17.51
17.43

0.48%
1.06%
2.73%
4.62%
3.57%
2.89%

1.58%
2.05%
1.64%
1.19%
1.41%
1.44%

overall

15.17

15.62

3.04%

0.49%

Simulated expected revenues in millions of 1982 dollars based on 1
million simulated auctions of each size n, scaled by the estimated
median value of the index γ(Xt , Ut ) in our sample. Bootstrap standard errors based on 800 replications.
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7.2

The Linkage Principle and Revenue Rankings

Milgrom and Weber (1982) and Milgrom (1987) identified the “linkage principle” as
a key force determining a seller’s preference among standard auction formats and
information revelation policies in an affiliated values setting. Loosely, the linkage
principle states that the information rents obtained by bidders can be limited (and the
surplus extracted by the seller enhanced) by linking the price the winning bidder pays
to realizations of random variables that are outside the winner’s control but affiliated
with the winner’s private information. Moving from a first-price sealed bid auction to
a second-price sealed bid auction, for example, enhances expected revenue by letting
the second-highest bid determine the price: this bid is a function of the secondhighest signal, which is affiliated with the winner’s signal.48 However despite the
central theoretical role of the linkage principle and implied “revenue ranking” results,
the existing literature provides few opportunities to quantify this effect empirically.49
We know of no such evaluation in the case of OCS auctions.
The third column of Table 9 presents simulated expected revenues for second-price
sealed bids auctions implied by our estimates.50 We report results at each value of
n from 2 to 7, as well as an overall figure obtained by mixing over the full range
of Nt in our sample according to its empirical distribution. Although the results
exhibit the revenue ranking implied by the theory, the estimated revenue gains from
switching to a second-price auction are modest, with overall gains of 3% (although still
around $450,000 per auction in 1982 dollars). This is consistent with our finding that
correlation among bidders’ private signals, while statistically significant, is relatively
weak.
48

Similarly, the Mineral Management Service’s use of royalties, which link the total price paid to
the realized value of the tract, can be justified by the linkage principle—at least in the absence of
ex post moral hazard (see, e.g., Riley (1988) and DeMarzo, Kremer, and Skrzypacz (2005)).
49

Shneyerov (2010) has done so for a sample of municipal bond auctions.

50

Equilibrium revenue in a second-price auction equals the second-highest pivotal expected value.
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As with the theoretical analysis of Milgrom and Weber (1982) and Milgrom (1987),
an important caveat is that we have held bidder entry behavior fixed in our simulations. In reality, changes in auction design that reduce bidder surplus at a given
level of competition should discourage entry, working against the anticipated gains in
revenue. Quantifying the equilibrium effect would require estimation of a structural
model of bidder entry (see, e.g., the extension discussed in section 8.1). However,
because we find that even the gains considered by Milgrom and Weber (1982) and
Milgrom (1987) would be fairly small, our results are quite informative. At least in
the case of these auctions, any gains from moving to a second-price auction to better
exploit the linkage principle appear to be limited.

8

Caveats, Extensions, and Challenges

Although our empirical approach offers several advantages for our study of OCS
auctions, it relies on some significant assumptions that will not be suitable for all
applications or questions. This is both an important caveat concerning our method
and a call for further work. Here we briefly discuss some initial extensions and possible
directions for future work.

8.1

Identifying a Structural Entry Model

We focused on identification and estimation of key features of the auction model.
However, many interesting policy questions concerning auctions and procurement
involve responses on the entry margin. Such responses generally cannot be evaluated
using a only a reduced form for entry outcomes. However, the identification results
we obtained above can make it possible to also identify the primitives of a structural
entry model consistent with our assumed reduced form.
We demonstrate this in Appendix F for the model in Example 1. In the case of
44

affiliated private values, our identification results above imply identification of the ex
ante expected profit (gross of entry costs) of entering the auction as a function of the
number of bidders. We show that this implies point identification of the structural
entry model—i.e., of the entry cost functions for neighbors and non-neighbors. In
the case of common values, because our identification results for the auction model
deliver upper and lower bounds on the ex ante expected profit of entry, one obtains
identification of bounds on these entry costs.
A full treatment of this extension, including development of appropriate estimation and inference procedures, is beyond the scope of the present paper. However,
due to the substantial importance of entry in determining auction outcomes and the
implications of auction policy, we view this as an important direction for further work.

8.2

Asymmetric Bidders

Our model assumed symmetry among bidders at the auction stage. Although we test
and fail to reject symmetry in our data, other applications may demand allowing ex
ante bidder heterogeneity. Symmetry is not essential to our method, although allowing asymmetry introduces two challenges. One concerns the potential multiplicity of
equilibria in the auction. This issue arises regardless of whether one considers unobserved heterogeneity or endogenous entry. As a result, prior empirical work has relied
on assumptions of suitable equilibrium selection rules, an assumption of independent
private values (where equilibrium uniqueness can be guaranteed), or numerical verification of uniqueness conditional on the estimates.51 An extension of our method to
asymmetric bidders will face the same challenge, and we will focus here on the case
of asymmetric independent private values for simplicity.
The second challenge is more tightly tied to our contribution and concerns whether
51

See, e.g., Campo, Perrigne, and Vuong (2003), Krasnokutskaya (2011), Athey, Levin, and Seira
(2011), Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2011), and Somaini (2015).
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natural asymmetric games of entry followed by bidding lead to a deterministic reduced
form entry equation like (3). Such an equation is essential to our approach, and asymmetries between potential entrants are known to create the potential for multiplicity
in entry games. However, by focusing on the number of entrants within a given class
of bidders, a deterministic relationship can arise naturally.
We demonstrate this in Appendix G. There we consider a fully specified asymmetric game similar to Example 1 in which the auction stage involves two classes of
bidders (here, neighbors and non-neighbors), as is common in applications permitting bidder asymmetry. We show that equilibrium behavior in this example leads to a
reduced form for neighbor entry taking the same form as (3). This allows straightforward adaptation of our key identification insights, although we leave open important
questions concerning appropriate estimators.52

8.3

Binding Public Reserve Prices?

Our baseline model assumed the absence of a binding public reserve price at the
auction. Although we developed an extension allowing a binding secret reserve price,
these two cases will not cover all applications. One significant challenge to allowing a
binding public reserve price within our framework would be the need to observe the
number of firms entering (i.e., acquiring signals), as it is this entry outcome one might
hope to exploit using a reduced form entry equation. In simpler models, firms endowed
with signals are often called “potential bidders,” and one often requires observation of
the set (or number) of potential bidders for identification of auction models. However,
when endogenenous signal acquisition is contemplated, it often becomes more difficult
to justify an assumption that this set is correctly observed by the econometrician.
52

Testing for common values in an asymmetric setting would require adjustments to the testing
procedure as well, as one must focus on exogenous changes in participation that unambiguously raise
or lower the severity of the winner’s curse.
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In some settings, the set of “planholders” (e.g., Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2011))
may both be observable and correctly define the set of firms acquiring signals. The
potential adaptation of our ideas to such a setting is a topic we must leave to future
research.

8.4

Overidentifying Restrictions and Ex Post Values

In our application we examined several testable implications of our model, some of
which take the form of overidentifying restrictions:
(i) bidding strategies are strictly increasing;
(ii) pivotal expected values are weakly stochastically decreasing in n;
(iii) bid distributions respond to variation in n;
(iv) bid distributions for neighbors and non-neighbors are identical.
In several cases, our tests of these restrictions relied on other maintained hypotheses—
e.g., our index structure—and therefore provide some assurance about these assumptions as well. In our discussion of identification we also noted several other sources of
overidentifying restrictions.53 However, we have left to future work the development
of formal testing procedures. It would also be interesting to explore whether the
sources of overidentification in our setting could allow identification in a more general
model.
A closely related question is the potential value of additional observables. In
the case of OCS auctions, an observable we have not exploited is (an estimate of)
the ultimate value of each tract based on extracted volumes of oil and gas, realized
53

A referee points out that additional restrictions arise from the fact in that in our model Zt
affects bids only through Nt but can exhibit more variation than Nt . For example, given any
x, following the arguments used in Lemma 1 we have inf {ln Bit |Nt = n(x, z), Xt = x, Zt = z} =
β 0 (s; n(x, z)) + γ (x, 0)), which must be invariant to z within any set Z such that n(x, z) is the same
for all z ∈ Z.

47

market prices, and estimates of exploration and extraction costs.54 Major challenges
raised by the prospect of using these measures include those of measurement error,
sample selection (ex post values are observed only for drilled tracts), and the fact
that the observed values reflect just one realization of the time-series process whose
ex ante distribution is relevant at an auction. If one abstracts from these issue and,
in addition, assumes a pure common values model with no unobserved heterogeneity,
HPP showed that ex post values can be used along with bids to obtain identification.
Adapting their result to settings with unobserved heterogeneity raises another major
challenge, however: the fact that in settings with unobserved heterogeneity one typically can identify the distribution of pivotal expected values, but not their individual
realizations.55 This contrasts with auction models without unobserved heterogeneity,
and the distinction raises the question of whether/how one might combine ex post
values with bid data to learn about the ex ante joint distribution of bidder signals
and tract values.

9

Conclusion

We have proposed an empirical approach to first-price sealed bid auctions with affiliated values, unobserved auction-level heterogeneity, and endogenous bidder entry.
Applying our method to OCS auction data leads us to reject the private values model
in favor common values, a conclusion that is robust across a variety of specifications.
We found that ignoring unobserved heterogeneity can hide the presence of common
values, and that our specification tests allow us to reject specifications that ignore
unobserved heterogeneity. Despite the presence of affiliated signals and common values, however, we found that the Mineral Management Service would not benefit from
54

See, e.g., Hendricks and Porter (1988) or HPP.

55

This is true of our method as well as approaches to unobserved heterogeneity based on mixtures
or measurement error models.
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limiting competition to soften the winner’s curse, and that any revenue gains from
moving to a second-price sealed bid auction to better exploit the linkage principle
would likely be small.
While our empirical results confirm the conventional wisdom that oil lease auctions should be viewed as common values auctions, they also point to methodological
challenges. We obtained a useful form of partial identification for a common values
model, but the full set of primitives in common values models—even without unobserved heterogeneity—generally is not point identified without assumptions and data
beyond those we required. Thus it will be important to continue pursuit of approaches
to identification that exploit the features of particular settings (see, e.g., HPP or Somaini (2015)) and to explore extensions permitting unobserved heterogeneity in those
frameworks. It may also prove productive to pursue other forms of partial identification that can be used to address positive and normative questions. The recent work
of Syrgkanis, Tamer, and Ziani (2018) provides one such approach.
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Appendices
A

Equilibrium Entry in a Model of OCS Auctions

Here we consider a particular extensive form game of entry and bidding that is motivated by our application and yields the reduced form (3) for the entry outcome
presented in the text, including the assumed weak monotonicity conditions.56 This
example also demonstrates how our model can accommodate auction-specific unobservables that are of arbitrary dimension and correlated with auction-specific observables, despite the apparent contradiction to our assumption that Ut is a scalar and
independent of Xt . Accommodation of such correlation requires that we allow the interpretation of Ut to vary with the vector Xt . This precludes identification of (causal)
effects of covariates on the auction; but in typical auction applications auction-level
observables are primarily confounding factors to be controlled for rather than factors
whose effects are of direct interest. This section also motivates the instrument used
in our application. Finally, we discuss here the selection on unobservables that could
be implied by considering only auctions attracting at least one bid, as necessitated
by our data. We demonstrate that such selection introduces only an additional way
in which the interpretation of Ut varies with Xt .

A.1

Model

Consider a game of entry and bidding for the lease of a tract t. Let I denote the
set of all potential bidders (“firms”), and let I = |I|. The set I can be partitioned
into the set Zt of “neighbor firms”—holders of active leases on adjacent (“neighbor”)
tracts—and all other firms, I\Zt . Denote the number of neighbor firms by Zt = |Zt |.
56

Example 1 in the text provided a sketch.
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Let Vit denote the value of the lease to firm i (i’s “valuation”). Let Xt and Et denote,
respectively, observed and unobserved (to us) characteristics of lease t that affect
bidders’ valuations. Let Xt include (among other relevant characteristics) the number
of active leases on neighboring tracts and the set of bidders for each of those leases.57
We make no restriction on the dimension of Et and do not require independence
between Xt and Et .
The game consists of two stages. In the second stage, lease t is offered by firstprice auction to the Nt bidders who enter in the first stage. We assume there is
no binding reserve price in the auction.58 In the first stage, bidders simultaneously
choose whether to incur an entry cost in order to acquire a signal and participate in
the auction.59 Let ci (xt ) denote the entry cost for firm i. Neighbors have lower entry
costs. In particular, ci (xt ) = c (xt ) for a neighbor firm, whereas non-neighbor firms
have entry costs ci (xt ) = c (xt ) + δ (xt ), with δ (xt ) > 0.60
Firms acquiring signals become “bidders” and learn the number of competitors
they face. Let Nt denote the number of bidders. Let Sit denote the signal received by
bidder i. Given Nt = n, let St = (S1t , . . . , Snt ) and Vt = (V1t , . . . , Vnt , ) , where without
loss we re-label bidders as firms i = 1, . . . n. For any conditioning set Ω ⊆ (Xt , Zt , Et ),
let FSV (St , Vt |Nt , Ω) denote the conditional distribution of bidders’ signals and valuations. We assume FSV (St , Vt |Nt , Xt , Zt , Et ) satisfies standard smoothness, symmetry,
affiliation, and nondegeneracy conditions (see Assumption 2 in the text). We assume
57

In practice we represent the set of bidders for neighboring tracts more parsimoniously with the
number of such bidders.
58

In our application we consider an extension allowing a random reserve price.

59

As is standard in the literature, we assume that only bidders incurring the entry cost can
submit a bid (see, e.g., Levin and Smith (1994), Li and Zheng (2009), Athey, Levin, and Seira
(2011), Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2011), Gentry and Li (2014), or Bhattacharya, Roberts, and
Sweeting (2014)).
60

More generally, one can allow entry costs to depend on the instruments, writing c (xt , zt ) and
δ (xt , zt ). For example, in other applications one might have measures of signal acquisition costs
that vary across time or location. However, our discussion of sample selection exploits the exclusion
of Zt from entry costs.
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that Zt alters the joint distribution of signals and valuations only through its effect
on Nt , i.e.,
FSV (St , Vt |Nt , Zt , Xt , Et ) = FSV (St , Vt |Nt , Xt , Et ) ,
and that Zt is independent of Et conditional on Xt . We discuss the justification for
this conditional independence assumption below. We assume
Vit = Vit0 λ (Xt , Et ) ,

(A.1)

where the function λ is positive and the random variables V1t0 , . . . , Vn0t t , S1t , . . . , Snt t



are independent of (Xt , Et , Zt ) conditional on Nt . We assume that, for all x ∈ X,
λ(x, Et ) is continuously distributed with convex bounded support.
Note that we have not restricted the dimension of Et , imposed any monotonicity
condition on λ, or required independence between Xt and Et .61 Nonetheless, we can
obtain the model of unobserved heterogeneity in the text by representing the random
variable λ(Xt , Et ) in terms of its quantiles conditional on Xt . In particular, given
Xt = x, let Fλ (·|x) denote the CDF of the random variable λ (x, Et ), and let

Ut = Fλ (λ(x, Et )|x) .

(A.2)

For u ∈ [0, 1] define Fλ−1 (u|x) = inf {λ : Fλ (λ|x) ≥ u} and let
Γ (x, u) = Fλ−1 (u|x) .

(A.3)

Combining (A.2) and (A.3), for each x we have Fλ (Γ(x, Ut )|x) = Ut = Fλ (λ(x, Et )|x),
61

This may be important, as the nomination process by which tracts were offered for lease in our
sample period suggests that a tract with “undesirable” value of Xt may have been unlikely to be
offered unless the value of Et made the tract desirable. See, e.g., Hendricks, Porter, and Boudreau
(1987) for a discussion of the nomination process.
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i.e.,
Γ(x, Ut ) = λ(x, Et ).
By construction, Γ is strictly increasing (and continuous) in its second argument, and
Ut is uniform on [0, 1] conditional on Xt . And because Ut is a measurable function of
Et conditional on Xt , Ut is independent of Zt conditional on Xt .
Note that in this new representation of the model, the distribution of Ut does
not vary with Xt , but its interpretation generally will. Because Γ(xt , ut ) = λ(xt , et )
for all t by construction, Γ(Xt , Ut ) fully characterizes the variation and dependence
in valuations and bids that arises from the observables and unobservables. Likewise,
controlling for the value of Γ(Xt , Ut ) fully controls for the effects of auction observables
and unobservables (Xt , Et ) on valuations, bids, and equilibrium first-order conditions.
However, Γ does not characterize the effect of a change in Xt holding unobservables
fixed, since our Ut is redefined at every value of Xt .

A.2

Equilibrium

We henceforth use the representation of the model just derived. The set of firms I, the
rules of the game, the values of (Xt , Ut , Zt ), and the distribution FSV (St , Vt |Nt , Xt , Ut )
are common knowledge among firms. We consider perfect Bayesian equilibrium in
pure strategies, with weakly increasing strategies in the auction stage.
The second stage of the game is identical to the first-price sealed bid auction with
symmetric affiliated values studied by Milgrom and Weber (1982), who characterize
the unique Bayes-Nash equilibrium in increasing bidding strategies. Bidder i’s payoff
in the auction stage can be written as a function of the commonly known (Nt , Xt , Ut )
and the realized bidder signals St . As noted in the text, multiplicative separability
of valuations is inherited by equilibrium bids. This implies that a bidder’s ex post
profit, denoted by π (Sit , S−it , Nt , Xt , Ut ), is strictly increasing in the index Γ(Xt , Ut )
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and, therefore, strictly increasing in Ut . Further, we assume the usual case in which
the ex ante expected equilibrium payoff

π̄ (Nt , Xt , Ut ) = E [π (Sit , S−it , Nt , Xt , Ut ) |Nt , Xt , Ut ]
is strictly decreasing in Nt .62
In the entry stage, firms make decisions based on the cost of entry and expected
profit from participating in the auction. Let Cit = ci (Xt ). For firm i, entering when
n − 1 other firms will also enter implies expected profit

π̄ (n, Xt , Ut ) − Cit .

Conditional on (Xt , Zt , Ut ), and given equilibrium beliefs about payoffs in the
auction stage, the entry stage is then equivalent to the entry game in Berry (1992).
Berry showed that a pure strategy equilibrium exists and that with probability one
all equilibria exhibit the same number of entrants, given by

η (Xt , Zt , Ut ) = max {n : π̄ (n, Xt , Ut ) − Cit ≥ 0} .
0≤n≤I

Recall that (Xt , Zt ) determine the values of {Cit }i∈I . Thus, in any pure strategy
perfect Bayesian equilibrium (with weakly increasing bidding) we have

Nt = η (Xt , Zt , Ut ) .

Because π̄ (Nt , Xt , Ut ) is strictly increasing in Ut , η is weakly increasing in Ut .
62

We know of no counterexample to strict monotonicity in Nt under the assumption that Ut is
the only latent source of dependence between the entry and auction stages—i.e., that Assumption
12 holds. Nonmonotonicity (within the relevant range of Nt ) could lead to existence of multiple
equilibria with different numbers of bidders.
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A.3

The Instrument

Our instrument for bidder entry Zt is the number of neighbor firms. First consider
the exclusion requirement (Assumption 5). We have assumed directly that Zt is independent of (St , Vt0 ) conditional on Nt , i.e., that Xt are the only observables directly
affecting bidder valuations.63 However we must verify that Zt is also independent
of Ut conditional on Xt . A tract with three neighbor leases, for example, may have
one, two, or three neighbor firms, depending on which bidders for the neighboring
leases won those auctions. Given the number of neighbor leases and the bidders for
each neighbor tract (i.e., conditional on Xt ), the number of distinct winners reflects
only random variation in bidders’ signals at prior auctions. Recall that signals are assumed independent of tract-specific unobserved heterogeneity and independent across

conditional independence requirement Zt

|=

tracts. Thus, even in the case of spatially correlated tract-level unobservables Et , the
Ut |Xt will hold.

Regarding the “relevance” requirement for the instrument Zt ,64 observe that
changes in the number of neighbor firms affects entry because for some combinations of (Xt , Zt , Ut ) the market will accommodate the n + 1st entrant only if there is
a potential bidder with low signal acquisition cost. For example, we will sometimes
have two entrants because the market would support entry by a third (low cost)
neighbor, but not by a third firm that is a (high cost) non-neighbor. Thus, larger
values of Zt will lead, all else equal, to weakly larger numbers of entrants.
63

This could fail here if the number of neighbor firms had a direct effect on tract value (given Xt ),
e.g., by driving up costs of negotiating production from common pools.
64

This discussion is informal. We state formal “relevance” conditions for nonparametric identification in section 3.
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A.4

Truncation

In the OCS data we observe no information about (even existence of) leases offered
for sale but attracting no bids. Given the tract nomination process in place during
the sample period, this may not have been a frequent phenomenon. But existence
of such leases could imply a form of selection on unobservables: leases attracting no
bids would be those with relatively undesirable unobservables. Here we demonstrate
that such selection is accommodated by interpreting the unobservable in our model
as that conditioned on the event that the auction attracts at least one bid.
In our model, offered leases attracting no bids are those for which

π (1, xt , ut ) ≤ cit

∀i ∈ I.

(A.4)

Letting π −1 (c; 1, x) = sup {u : π (1, x, u) < c}, we can rewrite (A.4) as65

ut ≤ π

−1



min ci (xt ) ; 1, xt ,
i∈I

or, more simply given our definition of ci (xt ),

ut ≤ u (xt ) .

Recalling that the definition of Ut already changes with each value of Xt , we obtain
the original model by redefining Ut to denote the value of the unobservable conditional
on truncation at u(Xt ).66
65
Note that the threshold for attracting a single bidder varies depending on the presence of at
least one neighbor tract (firm), but not with the number of neighbor firms Zt .
66

More formally, going back to the original formulation of the unobserved heterogeneity in terms of
Et , let π̃ (Nt , Xt , Et ) denote the expected second-stage payoff for a bidder facing Nt − 1 opponents
given (Xt , Et ). Under the separable structure (A.1), we have π̃ (Nt , Xt .Et ) = π̃ 0 (Nt ) λ (Xt , Et ).
i (xt )
. Thus, we modify the conGiven Xt = x, we have a zero-bidder auction when λ (x, Et ) ≤ minπ̃i0c(1)
struction of Ut by letting Fλ (·|x) denote the CDF of λ (x, Et ) conditional on λ (x, Et ) >
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mini ci (xt )
π̃ 0 (1)

.

B

Proofs Omitted from the Text

Corollary 1. Under Assumptions 1–6, the distribution of Ut |(Xt , Nt ) is identified.67
Proof. We can express Pr (Ut ≤ u|Xt = x, Nt = n) as
Z
FU |XN (u|x, n) =

FU |XZN (u|x, z, n) dζ (z|x, n)

(B.1)

where FU |XZN is the distribution of Ut |(Xt , Zt , Nt ) and ζ is the distribution of Zt |(Xt , Nt ).
Conditional on Nt = n, Zt = z, and Xt = x, Ut is uniform on [τn−1 (x, z) , τn (x, z)],
and by Theorem 1 the endpoints τn−1 (x, z) and τn (x, z) are identified. So FU |XZN
is known. Since ζ is directly observed, the result follows from (B.1).



Lemma 2. Under Assumptions 1–8, for all n ≥ n, all (x, z) ∈ Y (n), and all (x0 , z 0 ) ∈
Y (n), γ (x, τn (x, z)) − γ (x0 , τn−1 (x0 , z 0 )) is identified.
Proof. For n∗ as defined in Assumption 8, take n ≤ n∗ and let x (n), z (n), and ẑ (n)
be as in part (i) of Assumption 8 so that
n (x (n) , z (n)) = n
(B.2)
n (x (n) , ẑ (n)) = n + 1.
Since (x (n) , z (n)) ∈ Y (n) and (x (n) , ẑ (n)) ∈ Y (n + 1), Lemma 1 implies identification of
γ (x0 , τn−1 (x0 , z 0 )) − γ (x (n) , τn−1 (x (n) , z (n)))

(B.3)

γ (x00 , τn (x00 , z 00 )) − γ (x (n) , τn (x (n) , ẑ (n)))

(B.4)

and

67

For convenience we restate the results being proved in this appendix.
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for all (x0 , z 0 ) ∈ Y (n) and (x00 , z 00 ) ∈ Y (n + 1). By (4) and (B.2),
τn−1 (x (n) , z (n)) = 0 = τn (x (n) , ẑ (n)) ,

so subtracting (B.3) from (B.4) yields identification of
γ (x00 , τn (x00 , z 00 )) − γ (x0 , τn−1 (x0 , z 0 ))

(B.5)

for all (x00 , z 00 ) ∈ Y (n + 1) and (x0 , z 0 ) ∈ Y (n). By Assumption 7, there exists some
(x00 , z 00 ) that is in both Y (n + 1) and Y (n). The claim then follows from Lemma 1.
A symmetric argument applies for n > n∗ .68



Lemma 3. Let Assumptions 1–8 hold. Then for all n ≥ n and all (x, z) ∈ Y (n), the
values of γ (x, τn−1 (x, z)) and γ (x, τn (x, z)) are identified.
Proof. We proceed by induction, starting with n = n. By the normalization (1),
γ (x0 , 0) = 0, where for some z we have (x0 , z) ∈ Y (n). Lemma 1 then implies
identification of γ (x, τn−1 (x, z)) for all (x, z) ∈ Y (n). Lemma 2 then implies identification of γ (x, τn (x, z)) for all (x, z) ∈ Y (n). Now take any n > n and suppose that
γ (x, τn−1 (x, z)) is known for all (x, z) ∈ Y (n − 1). By Assumption 7 there exists a
point (x̃, z̃) in Y (n − 1) ∩ Y (n). Since we have already identified γ (x̃, τn−1 (x̃, z̃)), by
Lemma 1 we also know the value of γ (x, τn−1 (x, z)) for all (x, z) in Y (n). By Lemma
2, this implies identification of γ (x, τn (x, z)) for all (x, z) in Y (n) .
68



Note that the arguments used to show Lemmas 1 and 2 will often imply several forms of overidentification. For example, Lemma 1 implies overidentification of γ (x0 , τm (x0 , z 0 )) − γ (x, τm (x, z)) for
any m which is both smaller than min {n (x0 , z 0 ) , n (x, z)} and larger than max {n (x0 , z 0 ) , n (x, z)}.
And while Assumption 7 ensures only that there exist one (x̃, z̃) ∈ Y (n) that is also in Y (n − 1),
when there is more than one such pair the proof of Lemma 2 will provide multiple ways of constructing the same value of a given difference γ (x00 , τn (x00 , z 00 )) − γ (x0 , τn−1 (x0 , z 0 )). Finally, in practice
there may often be more than one value of n∗ satisfying Assumption 8, resulting in some duplication
in the differences identified in the two halves of the proof of Lemma 2.
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Lemma 4. Under Assumptions 1–9, τn−1 (Xt , Zt ) is continuous in Zt on the pre-image
of (0, 1) .
Proof. Fix n, x, and z such that τn−1 (x, z) ∈ (0, 1). Let τ = τn−1 (x, z) and let
ν > 0 be sufficiently small that τ + ν < 1 and τ − ν > 0. We show that for any
such ν there exists  > 0 such that for every z 0 satisfying kz 0 − zk <  we have
τn−1 (x, z 0 ) ∈ (τ − ν, τ + ν). Let δ = ν/2. By the definition of τn−1 (x, z) and weak
monotonicity of η in Ut , η(x, z, τ − δ) < n. So by Assumption 9 there exists 1 > 0
such that for any z 0 satisfying kz 0 − zk < 1 , η(x, z 0 , τ 0 ) < n for some τ 0 ∈ (τ − 2δ, τ ).
Similarly, because η(x, z, τ + δ) ≥ n, Assumption 9 ensures that there exists 2 > 0
such that for any z 0 satisfying kz 0 − zk < 2 , η(x, z 0 , τ 00 ) ≥ n for some τ 00 ∈ (τ, τ + 2δ).
Letting  = min{1 , 2 }, we have shown that for any z 0 satisfying kz 0 − zk < ,
η(x, z 0 , τ 0 ) < n for some τ 0 ∈ (τ − ν, τ ) while η(x, z 0 , τ 00 ) ≥ n for some τ 00 ∈ (τ, τ + ν).
At such z 0 , τn−1 (x, z 0 ) must lie in [τ 0 , τ 00 ].



Lemma 5. Under Assumptions 1–11, conditional on any Nt = n, the joint density
0
0
) is identified.
, . . . , Bnt
of (B1t

Proof. Fix Nt = n and Xt = x, where x is as in Assumption 11. Let ψB̃ denote
the characteristic function of the log bids (B̃1t , . . . , B̃nt ) conditional on Xt = x and
Nt = n. Let ψγ denote the characteristic function of γ (x, Ut ) conditional on Nt = n.
By (10), for (r1 , . . . , rn ) ∈ Rn we have
ψB̃ (r1 , . . . , rn ) = ψB̃ 0 (r1 , . . . , rn ) ψγ (r1 + · · · + rn ) ,
where ψB̃ 0 is the characteristic function of the log homogenized bids



0
0
B̃1t
, . . . , B̃nt



conditional on Nt = n. Since the distribution of Ut |(Xt , Nt ) is known (Corollary 1)
and γ is a known function (Theorem 2), ψγ is known. So under Assumption 11 the
equation
ψB̃ 0 (r1 , . . . , rn ) =

ψB̃ (r1 , . . . , rn )
ψγ (r1 + · · · + rn )
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uniquely determines ψB̃ 0 (r1 , . . . , rn ) for almost all (r1 , . . . , rn ). By continuity of characteristic functions this yields identification of ψB̃ 0 , implying identification of the joint


0
0
density of B̃1t
, . . . , B̃nt
.69 The result then follows.


C

Tests of Bidder Symmetry

Here we examine the bid data to assess the assumption of symmetry between neighbor
firms and non-neighbors in the auction stage—in particular, the implication that
equilibrium bids of neighbors and non-neighbors in any given auction are drawn from
the same marginal distribution. The key challenges arise from the need to account
for (a) auction heterogeneity through (Xt , Ut ); (b) dependence across auctions due
to spatial correlation of Ut ; (c) dependence among bids in the same auction due to
affiliation of bidder signals; and (d) the variation in equilibrium bidding strategies
with the number of bidders.
We consider tests based on within-auction differences in log bids, exploiting our
separability assumption.70 Recall that equilibrium log bids are given by
B̃it = B̃it0 + γ(Xt , Ut ),
so that
0
B̃it − B̃jt = B̃it0 − B̃jt

(C.1)

for any bids i, j in auction t.
Fix a value of n ≥ 2 and consider two distinct n-bidder auctions, t and t0 , such that
69

Because the same argument holds at all x ∈ X such that the characteristic function of γ (x, Ut )
is nonvanishing a.s., the argument demonstrating Lemma 5 may often yield overidentification.
70

Our reliance on the separability assumption implies that our tests below are in fact joint tests
of symmetry and separability. For other applications where such a joint test rejects, an interesting
question would be how one might evaluate the two hypotheses separately.
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there is at least one neighbor bidder in auction t and one non-neighbor in auction t0 .
Without loss, let bidder 1 be a neighbor in auction t and bidder 2 be a non-neighbor
in auction t0 . For each of the two auctions, let bidder 3 denote a randomly selected
(neighbor or non-neighbor) bidder in that auction.71 Then, by (C.1),
d

B̃1t − B̃3t = B̃2t0 − B̃3t0 .

(C.2)

We test the null (C.2) using standard two-sample tests of equal distributions. By
relying on within-auction differences we eliminate the effects of (Xt , Ut ). And by using
distinct auctions t and of t0 to construct the two samples, we also avoid dependence
across samples. Thus, this approach overcomes challenges (a)–(c) above. This leaves
the question of how to combine data across values of n in a way that overcomes
challenge (d).72 This requires that we avoid systematic differences across the two
samples in the mixing over n. We consider two ways of doing this.
In the first, we limit attention to auctions with at least one neighbor bidder and
one non-neighbor bidder. We begin by randomly partitioning these auctions into
two samples. For each auction in the first (second) sample, we take the difference
between the log-bid of a randomly selected neighbor (non-neighbor) and that of a
randomly selected opponent; these differences are then placed in the “neighbor sample” (“non-neighbor sample”).73 We test the null of equal distributions using a both a
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and a Cramér-von Mises test. Because the random components of this procedure imply random variation in test results, we repeat the procedure
71

Despite our indexing convention here, we do not require more than 2 bidders per auction. In
the case of a 2-bidder auction, “bidder 3” is simply the “other” bidder at this auction.
72

As elsewhere in the paper, we abuse notation slightly and let “n” refer to the number of bidders
when association with a particular auction is not essential.
73

In the neighbor (non-neighbor) sample, the neighbor’s (non-neighbor’s) log bid comes first in
the associated difference in (C.2), ensuring that the two distributions differ under the alternative
even when n = 2.
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many times and report average p-values.74 Because we randomly assign auctions to
the two samples, there is no ex ante difference in the mixing over n in the two samples.
And because we average over many replications of the random procedure, differences
in the mixing over n that do arise in each replication will “average out” across replications. Indeed, if we instead stratify on n when randomly partitioning the sample
of auctions, the average p-values obtained from each test are virtually identical.
This first approach has the appeal of comparing differenced bids of neighbors and
non-neighbors from the same population of auctions. However, because a relatively
small share of auctions has a bidder of each type, this limits the size of the samples
compared (to 578 total auctions, or 239 for each sample). Our second approach
instead uses all auctions with at least two bidders, including those with only neighbors
or only non-neighbors as bidders. This enables us to more than double the sample
size, although slightly more care must be taken to ensure equal mixing over n in
the two distributions. In particular, we assign auctions to the two samples using a
procedure that stratifies by n. For the “neighbor sample” we consider all auctions with
a neighbor bidder. Let NB(n) denote the number of n-bidder auctions in this sample.
For each auction in this sample we difference the log bids of a randomly selected
neighbor and a randomly selected bidder among its opponents. We construct the
“non-neighbor sample” using the remaining auctions, which have only non-neighbor
bidders. In our data the number of such auctions exceeds NB(n) for all n. So for
each n we select NB(n) auctions at random and construct the difference in log bids
between two randomly selected bidders. As with the first testing approach, we iterate
this procedure many times and report average p-values.
Table 10 shows the average p-values resulting from both approaches, using 800
replications. None of the four tests rejects at standard significance levels.
74

The sources of randomness involve the initial partition of auctions, the selection of which neighbor (non-neighbor) is chosen from each auction, and which opposing bid is used to construct the
difference.
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Table 10: Two-Sample Tests of Bidder Symmetry
observations
per sample

average p-values
K-S Test CvM Test

Approach 1

239

0.3047

0.7215

Approach 2

521

0.6764

0.3523

Average p-values over 800 replications.

D

Tests for Common Values: Alternative Specifications

Here we consider our tests for common values (and our specification test) under
several alternative specifications.

D.1

Random Reserve Price

Our baseline model ignores the fact that the MMS retained (and sometimes exercised) a right to reject all bids. A bidder who anticipates this rejection possibility
would have an incentive for more aggressive bidding than is implied by the standard
equilibrium first-order condition. In our sample this effect is likely to be small in
auctions attracting at least three bidders, where well over 99 percent of all winning
bids were accepted.75 However, the threat of rejection could be an important factor
in auctions attracting only one or two bidders.
To incorporate this feature, we follow Hendricks, Porter, and Spady (1989) and
75

Rejection of the high bid occurred more often at auctions dropped from our sample due either
to missing values or to their being auctions of leases on partial-block tracts.
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Hendricks, Porter, and Wilson (1994)) by modeling bid rejection with a random
reserve price whose value is unknown to bidders. From a bidder’s perspective, the
random reserve price is effectively an additional bid (submitted by the auctioneer),
leading to a first-order condition similar to that in the baseline case. We follow Bajari
and Hortaçsu (2003) by modeling the reserve price as drawn from the same marginal
distribution as a bid, although we re-scale the seller’s “bid” to fit the observed MMS
rejection decisions. We provide additional detail and discussion in Appendix E.
Figures 4a and 4b show the estimated marginal distributions of pivotal expected
values obtained with this alternative model. These are very similar to the estimates
obtained in the baseline model. In Figure 4a, where we allow unobserved heterogeneity, we see the pattern of first-order stochastic dominance predicted by common
values, with the magnitude of the estimated shifts in the distributions declining with
n. Figure 4b again shows that, if unobserved heterogeneity is ignored, we obtain
estimated distributions ordered in the direction opposite that implied by common
values. As shown in Table 11, the formal tests are also very similar to those in the
baseline case. In particular, when we account for unobserved heterogeneity, the test
for common values leads us to reject private values, with p-values between 0.02 and
0.03. However, we se no evidence of common values when we ignore unobserved
heterogeneity.76

76

As discussed in Appendix E, with the random reserve price, violations of weak stochastic ordering
need not imply rejection of the model. Thus, although we display the results of the specification
tests, apparent rejections observed when we ignore unobserved heterogeneity should be viewed only
as suggestive in this case.
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Figure 4: Random Reserve
(a) With UH

(b) No UH
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Table 11: Test p-values
Random Reserve Specification
Test for Common Values

{2,3} vs. {4,5}
{4,5} vs. {6,7}
Max (coarse binning)
Max (fine binning)

With UH

No UH

0.023
0.278
0.027
0.028

0.306
0.759
0.605
0.664

Specification Test∗

{2,3} vs. {4,5}
{4,5} vs. {6,7}
Max (coarse binning)
Max (fine binning)
∗

D.2

With UH

No UH

0.847
0.839
0.960
0.910

0.036
0.071
0.075
0.245

See footnote 76 and Appendix E.

Semi-nonparametric Entry Model

In the results presented so far, the entry model was estimated as an ordered probit:
in the notation of section 4.1.1, the distribution H(·) was specified as the standard
normal. Although H could be chosen arbitrarily if we specified each αn (x, z) nonparametrically, with our parametric specification of the thresholds αn (x, z) the choice of H
could matter. Thus, we consider here an alternative semi-nonparametric specification
in which H(·) is approximated flexibly with Hermite polynomials.
Following Gallant and Nychka (1987), H is specified as the continuous distribution
P
2
K̃
k
σ

φ(), where K̃ is the order of the Herfunction with density h() = θ1h
k=0 k
mite polynomial approximation, σk are parameters, φ is the standard normal density,
2
R ∞ PK̃
k
and θh = −∞
σ

φ()d. We set K̃ = 3. Because the entry model affects
k
k=0
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only the way that we control for unobserved heterogeneity, we examine here only the
results obtained from the model allowing unobserved heterogeneity.

Figure 5: SNP Entry Model
With UH

In Figure 5 we plot the estimated distributions of homogenized pivotal expected
values obtained when we use this alternative specification of the entry model. These
distributions exhibit patterns very similar to those from the baseline model. Table 12
confirms that the formal test results are also very similar. Indeed, the statistical evidence of common values is slightly stronger (smaller p-values) with this more flexible
specification.
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Table 12: Test p-values
With SNP Entry Model
Test for Common Values
With UH
{2,3} vs. {4,5}
{4,5} vs. {6,7}
Max (coarse binning)
Max (fine binning)

0.014
0.198
0.015
0.004

Specification Test
With UH
{2,3} vs. {4,5}
{4,5} vs. {6,7}
Max (coarse binning)
Max (fine binning)

D.3

0.923
0.948
0.995
0.933

No Year Fixed Effects

Our previous specifications included year fixed effects. These provide flexible control
for a number of common-knowledge time-varying factors such as macro shocks, variation in oil and gas prices, changes in industry structure, regulatory changes, etc.,
which vary substantially over the three decades of our sample. We saw the importance of this temporal variation in Table 6. However, in some applications one might
not have sufficient sample size to allow such flexibility. Without the fixed effects,
time varying factors would be an additional source of unmeasured heterogeneity, and
it is interesting to explore what happens in such cases. We therefore consider a
specification that drops the year fixed effects.
The estimated distributions of pivotal expected values are shown in Figures 6a and
6b. When we account for unobserved heterogeneity and endogenous entry we obtain
estimated distributions of pivotal expected values that are again ordered as we would
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expect under common values. The specification ignoring unobserved heterogeneity
yields estimated distributions that are ordered—now more sharply than in the baseline
specification—in the direction indicating misspecification of the model.
When we examine the formal test results in Table 13, the statistical evidence
aligns with the impression given by the figures. For the model allowing unobserved
heterogeneity, the rejections of private values in favor of common values are at slightly
larger significance levels than in the baseline specification, particularly in the case of
fine binning. However, the more striking difference is the stronger rejection of the
model that assumes no unobserved heterogeneity. This is as we would expect: as more
auction-level factors are forced into the unobservable, the misspecification implied by
ignoring unobserved heterogeneity is likely to be more severe.

Table 13: Test p-values
No Year Fixed Effects
Test for Common Values

{2,3} vs. {4,5}
{4,5} vs. {6,7}
Max (coarse binning)
Max (fine binning)

With UH

No UH

0.024
0.319
0.028
0.095

0.406
0.841
0.748
0.985

Specification Test

{2,3} vs. {4,5}
{4,5} vs. {6,7}
Max (coarse binning)
Max (fine binning)
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With UH

No UH

0.976
0.744
0.937
0.942

0.069
0.009
0.009
0.625

Figure 6: No Year Fixed Effects
(a) With UH

(b) No UH
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D.4

No Drainage Tracts

“Drainage” tracts are those adjacent to productive leases. It is natural to imagine
that owners of neighbor leases have an advantage in assessing the value of adjacent
tracts. The path-breaking paper of Hendricks and Porter (1988) focused on drainage
tracts and assumed that only the neighbor firm had access to a private signal of the
tract value, whereas non-neighbors relied solely on common knowledge information.
Our model of entry in OCS auctions (see Example 1) can be viewed as relaxing this
structure by allowing less extreme forms of asymmetries in signal acquisition costs
and permitting competition between multiple neighbors.77 However, our model is
one in which bidders choosing to acquire signals have private information of (ex ante)
equal precision: bidders are symmetric in the auction stage. Formal tests of this
assumption (see Appendix C) give no indication that this assumption is violated.
But as a robustness check we can repeat our entire analysis dropping all drainage
tracts.
Unsurprisingly, restricting the sample in this way eliminates much of the variation
in our instrument. This is an important limitation. Recalling the discussion in section
3, it means that the results in this case will likely be more heavily reliant on the functional form of the index function γ, and are likely to be less precisely estimated. The
estimated distributions in this case, shown in Figures 7a and 7b, are in fact very similar to those obtained from the full sample. However, the formal test results show that
there is indeed a loss of precision. When we allow for unobserved heterogeneity, the
coarse binning test for common values comparing “low” and “medium” competition
yields a p-value of 0.162, with a p-value of 0.168 for the max test. With fine binning,
the max test yields a p-value of 0.075. The fine binning comparison between n = 2
77

Hendricks and Porter (1988) assume that if there are multiple neighbors, only one submits
a serious bid. This leads to the result that non-neighbors bid in equilibrium despite having no
information, using mixed strategies. Such behavior is possible in equilibrium when there is no cost
of bidder entry.
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and n = 3, where we expect the largest effect of the winner’s curse, yields a p-value
of 0.030. Specification tests applied to the model ignoring unobserved heterogeneity
yield p-values between 0.13 and 0.19 from the coarse binning tests.
While we can still reject private values in favor of common values at the 10% level
(or at the 5% level using the fine binning test for n = 2 vs. n = 3), the statistical
evidence is less definitive. These results indicate that, while the patterns in the
estimated distributions obtained from the full sample are robust to exclusion of the
drainage tracts, the variation in the instrument these tracts provide is important for
the precision of the results.

Table 14: Test p-values
No-drainage Specification
Test for Common Values

{2,3} vs. {4,5}
{4,5} vs. {6,7}
Max (coarse binning)
Max (fine binning)

With UH

No UH

0.162
0.485
0.168
0.075

0.344
0.651
0.463
0.508

Specification Test

{2,3} vs. {4,5}
{4,5} vs. {6,7}
Max (coarse binning)
Max (fine binning)
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With UH

No UH

0.856
0.742
0.863
0.724

0.188
0.134
0.149
0.246

Figure 7: No Drainage Tracts
(a) With UH

(b) No UH
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E

Additional Detail: Random Reserve Price

Here we provide additional detail regarding the random reserve price model discussed
in Appendix D.1. As discussed there, the MMS occasionally exercised its right to
reject all bids, typically when the number or level of bids received was low. Following
Hendricks, Porter, and Spady (1989) and Hendricks, Porter, and Wilson (1994), we
model this rejection policy by assuming that at each auction t the MMS used a
random reserve price Rt whose realization was unknown to bidders.
We let the distribution of Rt vary with the number of bidders and with the auction
characteristics (Xt , Ut ). The dependence on (Xt , Ut ) is assumed to mirror that of tract
valuations. Thus, we assume
Rt = Rt0 × Γ(Xt , Ut ),
where Rt0 is independent of (Xt , Ut , St , Vt ) conditional on Nt . In this formulation, a
homogenized winning bid Mt0 = maxi {Bit0 } is accepted if and only if Mt0 ≥ Rt0 . Let
HR (·|Nt ) denote the distribution of Rt0 given Nt .
Following Bajari and Hortaçsu (2003), for each value of n we model the distribution HR (·|n) using the marginal distribution of homogenized bids in an n-bidder
auction. However, to fit the data, we allow the MMS “bid” to be less aggressive than
a real bid by introducing a scaling factor σn .78 In particular, we assume



r
;n
.
HR (r|n) = min 1, GB 0
σn
Thus, the random reserve price has the same distribution as a re-scaled bid.
Motivated by the observed rejection frequencies (see Table 15 below), we estimate
78

Very similar results are obtained if we instead fit a lognormal distribution for Rt0 or allow the
homogenized reserve price to be correlated with the homogenized bids.
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separate scaling factors for n = 1, n ∈ {2, 3} and n ≥ 4. Taking the estimates
of θ = (θτ , θγ , θb ) as given, we fit these scaling parameters σ to the observed bid
acceptance decisions
Yit = 1{Mit ≥ Rt }
using the quasi-likelihood function

L(y; σ, θ̂) =
T
Y
t=1

Z

1

τnt (xt ,zt ;θ̂τ )



 yt

HR mt − γ(xt , u; θ̂γ )|nt ; θ̂b , σ ×
τnt (xt , zt ; θ̂τ ) − τnt −1 (xt , zt ; θ̂τ ) τnt −1 (xt ,zt ;θ̂τ )


1−yt
1 − HR mt − γ(xt , u; θ̂γ )|nt ; θ̂b , σ
du. (E.1)

Table 15 shows the actual and fitted bid acceptance rates for each value of n.

Table 15: Random Reserve Model Fit

n
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11–18

acceptance rate
actual
fitted
0.921
0.978
0.997
0.991
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000

0.917
0.981
0.991
0.997
0.995
0.998
0.998
0.998
0.997
0.999
0.999

Introducing the random reserve price requires only a minor change in the inversion
of bidder first-order conditions. Under the null hypothesis of private values, bidders’
75

homogenized pivotal expected values are identified using a revised first-order condition
w0 (sit ; nt ) = b0it +

GM 0 |B 0 (b0it ; b0it , nt )HR (b0it ; nt )
. (E.2)
GM 0 |B 0 (b0it ; b0it , nt )hR (b0it ; nt ) + gM 0 |B 0 (b0it ; b0it , nt )HR (b0it ; nt )

This allows testing of the private values null as in the baseline model.
An nuance here is that under the alternative of common values, the right-hand
side of (E.2) is not equal to w0 (sit , sit ; nt ) but to a weighted average79
ϕ(sit , nt )w0 (sit ; nt ) + [1 − ϕ(sit , nt )] w0 (sit ; nt ),

(E.3)

where
0

w (sit ; nt ) = E



Vit0


Sit = sit , max Sjt ≤ sit , Nt = nt
j6=i

(E.4)

denotes a bidder’s expected (homogenized) valuation conditional on his signal and
on winning the auction. This expectation is slightly different from the homogenized
pivotal expected value. And although both w0 (sit ; nt ) and w0 (sit ; nt ) are decreasing
in nt in a common values model, the weights ϕ(sit , nt ) also vary with nt , leaving an
ambiguous prediction regarding how the distribution of the weighted average varies
with nt . This implies that violations of the private values null might fail to reveal
themselves, and further that there may be no relationship between the estimated
distributions obtained from the first-order condition that can be explained only by
violation of the model’s maintained hypotheses.80
Given the stochastic ordering we do find, this caveat implies that the evidence we
79

The weight ϕ(sit , nt ) is equal to


h(b0it , nt )GM |B (b0it ; b0it , nt )/ h(b0it , nt )GM |B (b0it ; b0it , nt ) + H(b0it , nt )gM |B (b0it ; b0it , nt ) .

Observe that all weight is placed on the pivotal expected value when the rejection probability
1 − H(b0it , nt ) is zero.
80

A referee has noted that this issue will not arise if the weights ϕ(s, n) are weakly increasing in
n, which is itself a verifiable condition.
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obtain in favor of common values from this specification is conditioned on a maintained assumption that our model is correctly specified. Such conditioning is typical
in hypothesis testing but unlike the baseline specification, where we could partition
the set of all possible outcomes to those consistent with private values, those consistent with common values, and those inconsistent with the model.

F

Identification of a Structural Entry Model

This appendix provides identification results, referenced in section 8.1, for the fully
specified model of entry in Example 1.81

F.1

Affiliated Private Values

We begin with the case in which bidders have affiliated private values in the auction
stage. Our identification results in the text immediately imply identification of the
ex ante gross profit of entering auction t, defined as π̄ (Nt , Xt , Ut ) in Appendix A.
Recall that this function is strictly increasing in Ut . The conditional distribution of
Ut |Xt , Zt is also known (it is uniform [0, 1]). Thus, we need only show identification of
the entry costs c (Xt , Zt ) and c (Xt , Zt ) + δ (Xt , Zt ) for neighbors and non-neighbors,
respectively.
Consider arbitrary values, x and z, of Xt and Zt . For n ≤ z, our equilibrium entry
conditions imply (see also Berry (1992))

Pr(Nt < n|Xt = x, Zt = z) = Pr (π̄ (n, x, Ut ) < c(x, z)|Xt = x, Zt = z)
= Pr Ut < π̄ −1 (c(x, z); n, x) |Xt = x, Zt = z



= π̄ −1 (c(x, z); n, x) .
81

Here we work with the more general version of the model in which firms’ entry costs are permitted
to vary with Zt .
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Applying the function π̄ (n, x, ·) to both sides, we obtain

π̄ (n, x, Pr(Nt < n|Xt = x, Zt = z)) = c(x, z).

Because the function π̄ is known and Pr(Nt < n|Xt = x, Zt = z) is observed, identification of c(x, z) follows.
For n > z, in equilibrium we obtain Nt = n only when at least one non-neighbor
enters. Thus, the entry equilibrium conditions imply

Pr(Nt < n|Xt = x, Zt = z) = Pr (π̄ (n, Xt , Ut ) < c(x, z) + δ (x, z) |Xt = x, Zt = z)
= π̄ −1 (c(x, z) + δ (x, z) ; n, x) .

We now obtain identification of δ (x, z) from

π̄ (n, x, Pr(Nt < n|Xt = x, Zt = z)) = c(x, z) + δ(x, z).

F.2

Common Values

Now consider the case of common values, where we will obtain partial identification of
the entry cost functions. The ex ante gross expected profit from entering the auction
is given by
Z sZ

s

[w (s, y; x, u, n) − β (s; x, u, n)] dFsy (s, y)

π̄ (n, x, u) =
s

s

where Yi = y denotes the realized maximum signal among a bidder i’s opponents and
Fsy (s, y) denotes the joint distribution of (Si , Yi ).82 Our identification results in the
82

Strict monotonicity of equilibrium bidding strategies implies that the joint distribution of signals
(appropriately normalized, e.g., to have uniform marginals) is identified from the joint distribution
of homogenized bids.
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text for the auction model allow us to bound this function using the fact that for
y < s,
w(y, y; x, u, n) ≤ w(s, y; x, u, n) ≤ w(s, s; x, u, n),
where our results imply that the outer values are identified. Let π̄H (n, x, u) and
π̄L (n, x, u) denote the resulting bounds. Note that these functions will also be strictly
increasing in Ut .
To demonstrate the partial identification of entry costs, again fix Xt and Zt at
arbitrary values x and z. For n ≤ z, we now obtain

Pr(Nt < n|Xt = x, Zt = z) ≤ Pr (π̄L (n, x, Ut ) < c(x, z)|Xt = x, Zt = z)
= Pr Ut < π̄L−1 (c(x, z); n, x) |Xt = x, Zt = z



= π̄L−1 (c(x, z); n, x) .
Applying the strictly increasing function π̄L (n, x, ·) to both sides, we obtain

π̄L (n, x, Pr(Nt < n|Xt = x, Zt = z)) ≤ c(x, z).

A similar argument applies using the upper bound π̄H (n, x, u) to construct an
upper bound on c(x, z), and to construct upper and lower bounds on δ(x, z).

G

Asymmetric Bidders

Here we sketch a variation of Example 1 permitting asymmetry between neighbors
and non-neighbors in the auction. As discussed in section 8.2, we show here that
equilibrium in this example leads to a reduced form entry equation for neighbor firms
taking the same form as (3). Adaptation of the identification results in section 3
would then be straightforward: identification of the entry model and index function
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would follow the arguments in section 3.1 (focusing on neighbor entry alone), and
identification of the auction model would follow standard arguments, using equilibrium first-order conditions.
To be clear, allowing asymmetry in the auction introduces challenges that are not
special to our approach. Most significant is a lack of results ensuring a unique equilibrium in the auction itself. Due to this challenge, the empirical literature on auctions
with asymmetry has typically either assumed independent private values (e.g., Athey,
Levin, and Seira (2011), Krasnokutskaya (2011), Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2011)),
or relied on an assumption of unique equilibrium selection (e.g., Campo, Perrigne,
and Vuong (2003), Somaini (2015)). If one is willing to address equilibrium multiplicity in one of these ways, our approach can still offer a solution to the challenges
of unobserved heterogeneity and endogenous bidder entry. Given our purpose, here
we avoid discussion of equilibrium selection in the auction stage by limiting attention
to the asymmetric IPV case.
We retain most elements of Example 1. However, we drop the assumption of
exchangeable bidders, instead assuming exchangeability only within each of the two
groups. We assume firm information at the entry stage is asymmetric as well. Neighbor firms observe (Zt , Xt , Ut ) before their entry decisions. Non-neighbor firms observe
(Zt , Xt ) but learn Ut (along with their private signals) only upon entry. Neighbors
have commonly known entry cost c. Non-neighbors draw private entry costs Cit
independently from a smooth distribution FC .83 This private cost may reflect, for
example, the extent to which firm i has already collected the seismic data it would
need to analyze in order to learn the signal Sit .
To ease notation, we will denote neighbor firms as “group 1” and non-neighbor
firms as “group 2.” For clarity, we let K1t and K2t denote the number of firms in
each group; however, we again assume K1t = Zt and K2t = K − K1t , where K is
83

For simplicity we suppress any dependence of c or the distribution FC on (Xt , Zt ).
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the total number of firms in the industry.84 Common knowledge among all firms are
(K1t , K2t , c, FC , Zt , Xt ).
We consider a two-stage game of simultaneous entry, followed by a first-price auction in which the unobserved heterogeneity ut as well as entry outcomes (n1t , n2t )
are common knowledge. Following, e.g., Campo, Perrigne, and Vuong (2003), Athey,
Levin, and Seira (2011), Krasnokutskaya (2011), and Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2011),
we consider group-symmetric pure strategies for the auction continuation game. Such
strategies take the form βk (·; Xt , Ut , N1t , N2t ) for each group k = 1, 2, where Nk denotes the number of bidders from group k. As usual, equilibrium bidding strategies
inherit the multiplicative separability of valuations, so that
βk (·; Xt , Ut , N1t , N2t ) = βk0 (·; N1t , N2t ) Γ (Xt , Ut ) .

(G.1)

The ex ante expected profits to a bidder in the auction, given (Xt , Ut , N1t , N2t ) , then
inherit the multiplicative structure as well and can be written πk0 (N1t , N2t ) Γ (Xt , Ut ) .
Here, πk0 (N1t , N2t ) is strictly decreasing in both arguments. Recall from Appendix A
that Γ is strictly increasing and continuous in Ut .
We consider group-symmetric pure strategies in the entry stage as well. Such
strategies take the form of degenerate entry probabilities

e1 (Xt , Zt , Ut ) ∈ {0, 1}
e2 (Xt , Zt , Cit ) ∈ {0, 1}

for groups 1 and 2, respectively. We further assume a unique selection of e2 conditional on the auction-specific factors (Xt , Zt ) that are common knowledge at the
84

More generally it is sufficient that (Xt , Zt ) (with Zt potentially comprising multiple instruments)
determine K1t and K2t .
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entry stage.85 Denote by

% (Xt , Zt ) = Pr (e2 (Xt , Zt , Cit ) = 1|Xt , Zt )

the implied ex ante (before knowledge of Cit ) probability of entry by a given nonneighbor i.
We henceforth condition on a given value of (Xt , Zt ) and suppress these arguments
in the notation. Given any strategy e2 , a firm of type 1 then has expected gross profit
from entering conditional on n1 (i.e., the total number of type-1 entrants, including
this firm) given by

K2t 
 0
 X
K2t n2
EN2t π1 (n1 , N2t ) Γ (u) |% =
% (1 − %)K2t −n2 π10 (n1 , n2 ) Γ (u) .
n2
n =0

(G.2)

2

Because this expected profit is strictly decreasing in n1 , by the arguments in Berry
(1992) there will be a unique number of neighbor entrants consistent with mutual
best-responses to the entry behavior characterized by %; i.e., the best response of
neighbors is summarized by the reduced form

N1t = η (Ut ; %) .

(G.3)

Because (G.2) is strictly increasing in u, η is weakly increasing in Ut .
Similar to the entry model in the text, the entry of neighbors can then be charac85

This assumption is weaker than the common requirement of unique equilibrium selection conditional on common knowledge observables, as we allow multiplicity in the strategies used by group 1.
As usual, this equilibrium multiplicity will turn out to be limited to the form of variation in which
firms enter, not the number of such entrants. Other work on asymmetric auctions with entry (e.g.,
Athey, Levin, and Seira (2011), Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2011)) rely on numerical confirmation of
a unique entry equilibrium.
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terized by thresholds τ` (%) ∈ [0, 1] where

τ` (%) = 0 for ` < n (%) ,
τ` (%) = 1 for ` ≥ n (%) ,

and, for ` = n (%) , . . . , n (%) − 1, τ` (%) is defined by


EN2t π10 (` + 1, N2t ) Γ (τ` (%)) |% = c.
Thus, given %, up to zero-probability events we have N1t = n if and only if Ut ∈
[τn−1 (%) , τn (%)].
Lemma 6. For all ` ∈ {0, 1, . . . }, τ` (%) is continuous in %.
Proof. Define an extension of the function Γ to the domain R as follows:


Γ (u)
u ∈ [0, 1]



Γ̄ (u) =
Γ (1) u
u>1




Γ (0) + u u < 0.
Observe that Γ̄ has range R, is continuous, and is strictly increasing. Thus, given any
% and ` ∈ {0, 1, . . . }, there exists a unique τ̄` (%) ∈ R defined by


EN2t π10 (` + 1, N2t ) Γ̄ (τ̄` (%)) |% = c.


For all τ the expectation EN2t π10 (` + 1, N2t ) Γ̄ (τ ) |% is continuous with respect to
%, so τ̄` (%) is continuous with respect to %. Now observe that for any ` ∈ {0, 1, . . . },
τ` (%) = max {0, min {1, τ̄` (%)}} . Because the min and max operators are continuous,
the result follows.
Now consider the entry decision of a non-neighbor firm i, taking the aggregate
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entry of neighbors as given by η(·; %). Firm i’s expected payoff from entering the
auction is π̄2 (%) − Cit , where

π̄2 (%) =

K
2 −1 
X
n̂=0


Z 1
K2 − 1 n̂
K2 −1−n̂
% (1 − %)
π20 (η(u; %), n̂ + 1) Γ (u) du.
n̂
0

(G.4)

Firm i’s best response is to enter when π̄2 (%) − Cit is nonnegative. This best response
behavior implies
% = FC (π̄2 (%)) .

(G.5)

To show that these strategies form a Bayes Nash equilibrium, we need to show
that (G.5) has a fixed point in % ∈ [0, 1]. This will follow from Brouwer’s fixed point
theorem if π̄2 (%) is continuous. From (G.4) it is clear that it is sufficient that
Z

1

π20 (η(u; %), n̂ + 1) Γ (u) du

0

be continuous in %. Observe that
Z

1

π20

(η(u; %), n̂ + 1) Γ (u) du =

0

n(%) Z
X
n1 =n(%)

τn1 (%)

π20 (n1 , n̂ + 1) Γ (u) du.

(G.6)

τn1 −1 (%)

To see that the right-hand-side is continuous in %, observe that a change in % can
alter this expression in two ways. One is through the limits of integration associated
with a given value of n1 . In this case the effects of % are continuous, since each
threshold τ` (%) is continuous in %. The second is through a change in n (%) or n (%).
The effects in this case are also continuous. For example, consider the case in which
an increase in % from %0 to any %0 ∈ (%0 , %0 + ) results in n (%0 ) < n (%0 ).86 Continuity
of


EN2t π10 (n, N2t ) Γ (0) |%
86

An increase in % can only reduce n (%).
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with respect to % (recall (G.2)) implies that for sufficiently small , n (%0 ) = n (%0 ) − 1.
Any such change from %0 to %0 will therefore add the term
τn(%0 ) (%0 )

Z

π20 (n1 , n̂ + 1) Γ (u) du

(G.7)

0

to the beginning of the sum (G.6). Letting ` = n (%0 ) = n (%0 ) − 1, note that τ` (%0 ) =
0. Thus, by Lemma 6, by setting |%0 − %0 | sufficiently small, τ` (%0 ) will be made
arbitrarily close to zero, implying an arbitrarily small value of (G.7). A similar
argument applies to all other cases in which a change in % causes a change in the
limits of the summation in (G.6).
Thus, equilibrium exists. Recalling that we conditioned on (Xt , Zt ), (G.3) provides
a reduced form
N1t = η (Xt , Zt , Ut )
for neighbor entry, with weak monotonicity in Ut .

H

Additional Computational Detail

Here we discuss additional computational aspects of our estimation procedure. A useful feature of the Bernstein polynomial specification is the ease of imposing otherwise
complex functional restrictions through linear restrictions on the vector of Bernstein
coefficients. For instance, a necessary and sufficient condition for the function to inteP
(j)
grate to one is that m
j=0 θb,n = m + 1. Additionally, the Bernstein polynomials allow
easy transformation between the density and associated cumulative distribution. In
particular,
0

G̃Bi0 (b̃ ; θ̃b , n) =

m+1
X

  
(j)
θ̃b,n qj,m+1 Φ b̃0 ,

j=0
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(H.1)

(0)

(m+1) 0

where θ̃b,n = (θ̃b,n , . . . , θ̃b,n

) = M θb,n for a known matrix M , and θ̃b = {θ̃b,n }nn=n .

This is useful because we require the CDF of the bid marginal when applying the
copula χ(·; ρn ) to compute the joint density in (13). In contrast to numerical integration, the transformation from density to CDF with Bernstein polynomials involves
only a linear transformation of parameters and is exact.
One key computational issue is how one can derive tractable expressions for
the conditional distributions that appear in the bid first-order condition (15). Below we show how the Gaussian copula can be leveraged to write G̃M |B (b̃0it |b̃0it , n)
and g̃M |B (b̃0it |b̃0it , n) using integrals of known normal distributions, which are easily computed using readily available methods. We first derive an expression for
G̃M |B (b̃0it |b̃0it , n). An expression for g̃M |B (b̃0it |b̃0it , n) follows naturally.
First, note that


0
B̃2t

0
b, . . . , B̃nt

0
b|B̃1t



≤
≤
=b
(H.2)

 


 

 
−1
0
?
−1
0
?
−1
0
?
G̃Bi0 B̃1t
=b ,
= Pr Φ
G̃Bi0 B̃2t
≤ b ,...,Φ
G̃Bi0 B̃nt
≤b Φ

G̃M |B (b|b, n) = Pr





where b? = Φ−1 G̃Bi0 (b) and we drop the dependence of G̃Bi0 on θ̃b and n for
notational convenience. The second equality holds for every b ∈ R, since the estimated
G̃Bi0 has always full support.
Second, note that the Gaussian copula parametrization of the joint distribution
of homogenized bids implies



 

 
0
0
, . . . , Φ−1 G̃Bi0 B̃nt
∼ N (0, Σρn ),
Φ−1 G̃Bi0 B̃1t

where Σρn is the covariance matrix with constant pairwise correlation ρn .
Finally, the conditional normal distribution is also normal, so we can re-write the
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conditional probability (H.2) as





G̃M |B (b|b, n) = Φ̃ Φ−1 G̃Bi0 (b) , . . . , Φ−1 G̃Bi0 (b) ,
−1

where Φ̃(·) is the multivariate Normal CDF with mean 1(n−1)×1 ρn Φ



G̃Bi0 (b) and

variance Σρn −ρn 2 . Therefore computation of G̃M |B (b|b, n) requires only the evaluation
of a known normal CDF.
This procedure naturally suggests one way of computing g̃M |B (b|b, n) as a multivariate integral. By definition,

g̃M |B (b|b, n) =






−1
−1
G̃Bi0 (b)
G̃Bi0 (b) , . . . , Φ
dΦ̃ Φ
db

,

By symmetry and using the Leibniz integral rule,

g̃M |B (b|b, n) =
(n−1)

g̃Bi0 (b)
φ(G̃Bi0 (b))

Z



Φ−1 G̃B 0 (b)

−∞

i

Z



Φ−1 G̃B 0 (b)
i



−1

φ̃ Φ

−∞





G̃Bi0 (b) , b3 , . . . , bn db3 . . . bn .

where we drop the dependence of g̃Bi0 on θb and n. The integral above is over a
known multivariate normal density. It can be computed quickly and reliably using
the algorithm suggested by Genz (1992).
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Table 16: Test p-values
Baseline Specification, Fine Binning

Test for Common Values

2 vs.
3 vs.
4 vs.
5 vs.
6 vs.
Max

3
4
5
6
7

With UH

No UH

0.001
0.212
0.662
0.625
0.073
0.019

0.046
0.703
0.869
0.733
0.270
0.541

Specification Test

2 vs.
3 vs.
4 vs.
5 vs.
6 vs.
Max

3
4
5
6
7

With UH

No UH

1.000
0.730
0.567
0.627
0.562
0.922

1.000
0.229
0.086
0.249
0.440
0.239
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Table 17: Entry Model Estimates
Alternative Specifications
No Year FE
Est.
SE
SE (BB)

89

# active leases
isolated lease
# firms that bid for neighbors
reoffered tract
neighbor expired
# neighbors drilled
# neighbor hits
depth
depth squared
royalty rate
time controls

X

-0.102
0.402
0.014
-0.293
-0.053
-0.011
0.055
-0.111
-0.060
0.024
Sale

0.026
0.031
0.086
0.096
0.011
0.011
0.062
0.069
0.068
0.074
0.027
0.029
0.028
0.027
0.162
0.360
0.065
0.234
0.015
0.020
year dummies

# neighbor firms

Z

0.151

0.040

0.041

No Drainage
Est.
SE
SE (BB)
-0.036
0.434
0.052
-0.108
0.017
-0.090
-0.353
-0.704
0.174
-0.012
Sale

0.046

0.037
0.044
0.129
0.141
0.020
0.021
0.093
0.106
0.092
0.108
0.041
0.042
0.253
0.254
0.198
0.309
0.073
0.133
0.023
0.031
year dummies

0.070

0.073

Est.

SNP
SE SE (BB)

-0.094
0.042
0.557
0.141
0.022
0.015
-0.242
0.093
-0.022
0.104
-0.053
0.040
0.077
0.038
-0.612
0.336
0.121
0.153
-0.004
0.026
Sale year dummies

0.182

0.059

Table 18: Index Function Estimates
Alternative Specifications

Est.

SNP
SE
SE (BB)

No time FE
Est.
SE
SE (BB)

No Drainage
Est.
SE
SE (BB)

90

# active leases
isolated lease
# firms that bid for neighbors
reoffered tract
neighbor expired
# neighbors drilled
# neighbor hits
depth
depth squared
royalty rate
time controls

X

0.013
0.060
0.032
-0.182
-0.277
0.047
-0.021
-0.248
0.094
-0.007
Sale

0.018
0.022
0.060
0.091
0.008
0.011
0.048
0.070
0.047
0.068
0.020
0.025
0.020
0.026
0.137
0.274
0.065
0.120
0.010
0.017
year dummies

-0.006
0.027
0.052
-0.245
-0.119
0.122
-0.047
1.203
-0.307
0.029
Sale

0.027
0.027
0.079
0.111
0.010
0.013
0.078
0.091
0.062
0.083
0.027
0.028
0.028
0.031
0.146
0.365
0.064
0.186
0.015
0.015
year dummies

0.006
0.048
0.036
-0.102
-0.203
0.058
-0.096
-0.442
0.161
0.015
Sale

0.023
0.030
0.085
0.123
0.013
0.019
0.064
0.093
0.060
0.087
0.029
0.042
0.177
0.219
0.160
0.297
0.071
0.124
0.013
0.023
year dummies

unobserved heterogeneity

U

1.319

0.291

1.989

0.584

0.941

0.358

0.405

0.646

0.513

Table 19: Copula Correlation Estimates
Alternative Specifications
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n

Est.

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11- 18

0.043
0.031
0.090
0.136
0.112
0.111
0.133
0.295
0.158
0.108

SNP
SE
SE (BB)
0.041
0.030
0.031
0.030
0.035
0.044
0.039
0.071
0.051
0.025

0.050
0.040
0.032
0.041
0.037
0.043
0.040
0.067
0.068
0.020

No time FE
Est.
SE
SE (BB)

No Drainage
Est.
SE
SE (BB)

0.197
0.212
0.275
0.301
0.259
0.342
0.261
0.400
0.307
0.246

0.024
0.007
0.053
0.111
0.083
0.090
0.160
0.290
0.155
0.098

0.049
0.040
0.038
0.031
0.032
0.061
0.039
0.076
0.055
0.029

0.051
0.042
0.038
0.042
0.042
0.041
0.052
0.073
0.055
0.031

0.056
0.033
0.034
0.035
0.034
0.043
0.052
0.071
0.053
0.026

0.060
0.047
0.036
0.042
0.036
0.040
0.046
0.082
0.063
0.026
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